I wonder if this can be regarded as another scientific problem haunted by the spectre of the "gloomy prospect", used in reference to another seemingly insoluble problem in behavior genetics?
I think it's a recurring problem that people who argue that there are limits to what we can possibly know, and provide arguments for why this or that specific domain is in principle unknowable (certain metaphysical issues for Kant, the phenomenology of those very different from us for Nagel, etc, many examples) are met with such hostility from certain quarters. Like, obviously it's fine to issue counter arguments against such claims. But it's like some people only hear the phrase "we can't know everything" (or something like it) and IMMEDIATELY go "oh so you hate science and rationality then????"
I keep wondering if there’s a positive formulation to du Bois-Reymond’s argument, or if there’s a positive equivalent in contemporary science, or philosophy of science. I swear there must be a little heuristic to describe what he’s saying: just a simple little rule. 🤷♂️
Note that Claude Bernard also praised justified ignorance:
"I support ignorance. There is my philosophy. I have the tranquility of ignorance and faith in science. Others cannot live without faith, without belief, without theology [or theory - the original is smudged. JSW]; I do without all of these. I do not know, and I shall never know; I accept this fact without tormenting myself about it." [Stebbins, Robert E. (1974), "France", in Thomas F Glick (ed.), The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 117-163. p 135f]
Thanks! I agree with your insight about negative theology; in fact, I used the term "negative epiphany" at one point in my book. I regard du Bois-Reymond's arguments as secular response to his father's Calvinism.
For more on the connection between EdBR and McGinn, see Neil Tennant, "Mind, Mathematics, and the Ignorabimusstreit," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(4) 2007: 745 – 773. It's a great essay.
I wonder if this can be regarded as another scientific problem haunted by the spectre of the "gloomy prospect", used in reference to another seemingly insoluble problem in behavior genetics?
So interesting!
I think it's a recurring problem that people who argue that there are limits to what we can possibly know, and provide arguments for why this or that specific domain is in principle unknowable (certain metaphysical issues for Kant, the phenomenology of those very different from us for Nagel, etc, many examples) are met with such hostility from certain quarters. Like, obviously it's fine to issue counter arguments against such claims. But it's like some people only hear the phrase "we can't know everything" (or something like it) and IMMEDIATELY go "oh so you hate science and rationality then????"
As if that RESPONSE were in any way rational.
I keep wondering if there’s a positive formulation to du Bois-Reymond’s argument, or if there’s a positive equivalent in contemporary science, or philosophy of science. I swear there must be a little heuristic to describe what he’s saying: just a simple little rule. 🤷♂️
Note that Claude Bernard also praised justified ignorance:
"I support ignorance. There is my philosophy. I have the tranquility of ignorance and faith in science. Others cannot live without faith, without belief, without theology [or theory - the original is smudged. JSW]; I do without all of these. I do not know, and I shall never know; I accept this fact without tormenting myself about it." [Stebbins, Robert E. (1974), "France", in Thomas F Glick (ed.), The Comparative Reception of Darwinism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 117-163. p 135f]
Nice quote! Thanks for posting.
Thanks! I agree with your insight about negative theology; in fact, I used the term "negative epiphany" at one point in my book. I regard du Bois-Reymond's arguments as secular response to his father's Calvinism.
For more on the connection between EdBR and McGinn, see Neil Tennant, "Mind, Mathematics, and the Ignorabimusstreit," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(4) 2007: 745 – 773. It's a great essay.