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SkinShallow's avatar

I wonder whether the label "overdiagnosis" is standing in for a different issue, one that comes up often but links less obviously to nosology: the medicalization of distress. Mental distress, and increasingly various forms of psychosomatic and psychosocial distress, can be framed in many ways. What people perceive as overdiagnosis as well as clients/patients SEEKING diagnoses may reflect the current dominance of the medical framing. On this view, the distress is real, and it coexists with overdiagnosis understood as the framing of human suffering as medical dysfunction. The discussion, then, is less about overdiagnosis as such than about the wider reframing of human suffering in medical and psychiatric terms, of which overdiagnosis is a symptom.

This, of course, links to the disappearance of other frames: socioeconomic, political, religious, moral etc.

Also intensity and aspiration to "feeling happy". Distress is thus real -- tho what LEVEL of distress is acceptable, normal, put-able with is also culturally determined (WHO redefinition of health can work as Exhibit 1 in this) -- but both individualised and medicalised framing is, excuse the term, "socially constructed".

Awais Aftab's avatar

Medicalization is indeed one of the intended meanings behind "overdiagnosis." I discussed that meaning of the term in a prior post on the different senses in which overdiagnosis is used: https://www.psychiatrymargins.com/p/the-overdiagnosis-confusion

The medicalization problem requires a different kind of answer. My answer is pluralism. More here as well: https://www.psychiatrymargins.com/p/the-ground-beneath-the-clinic

Zaidan Idrees Choudhary's avatar

Any discussion on how psychiatric disorders have "expanded" should include an honest look at the influence of the pharma industry.

Awais Aftab's avatar

That's fair. A more difficult question is how an accurate appraisal of the role of pharma influence would change the state of affairs today. I am not sure, tbh. Maybe some potential patients would be less willing to seek help and some physicians less likely to prescribe, but I suspect a lot may remain the same.

anguilla83's avatar

inoltre buona parte dei disturbi del DSM non ha farmaci specifici, i farmaci in quei casi sono utilizzati off-label

Stefansusan's avatar

Well, the day had to come when we would deeply disagree. I would say that sometimes emotional discomfort and distress is important and necessary. Sometimes guilt and even shame are the result of actions that should produce guilt and shame in someone who aspires to be a good person. One of my greatest dissatisfactions with psychiatry is that it feels untethered to character and morality. I think that's why Alcoholics Anonymous appeals to so many people: it recognizes that alcoholism hurts other people, and regardless of whether people are blameworthy for becoming alcoholics, they should try to make amends. i have seen diagnoses become an all-purpose explanation for not turning in classwork on time, or at all; for abusive mistreatment of others; for failure to keep promises; for neglect of children or worse. The diagnosis is not only an explanation, but an absolution. People with psychiatric disabilities are just like everyone else: some are generous and kind, some are selfish and deceitful. Parsing out where the disability drives the behavior, and whether it can be treated and ameliorated, is crucially important work. But I have noticed that people never attribute virtuous behavior to diagnoses, only behavior that would otherwise be subject to social condemnation. I am not saying at all that there is some kind of character/pathology binary distinction. I am saying questions of morality and character are no longer even raised in the context of psychiatry and that over-diagnosing, to me, is a question of rewriting the narrative of behavior to erase those questions.

Awais Aftab's avatar

Diagnosis as an all-purpose explanation is definitely a problem, along with the issues of responsibility, but also a different problem from that of overdiagnosis IMO.

Adam Kritzer's avatar

This is specious reasoning and conflates two very different issues. You seem to be arguing that since some people are prone to using their diagnosis to justify poor behavior that not affording this group of people a psychiatric diagnosis that is justified by the DSM would somehow be a good thing?

Also, while I would agree that shame, guilt and other unpleasant emotions are an important part of the human condition and often serve socially necessary purposes, they can also drive distress especially when they lead to unhealthy rumination. Unfortunately, I'm speaking from personal experience in this case.

Stefansusan's avatar

Diagnoses may serve a purpose in sorting out what medications might be likely to treat the condition. But in terms of individual therapy, I think the therapy is an individual interaction between someone who is suffering and asking for help, and someone who is listening and trying to help. I know that some people are reassured and comforted that what they are going through has a name, that other people are suffering in the same way. From forty years doing this work, I think what people most need from therapists is to be heard and supported, more than a diagnosis. But what is hard for therapists to do is to suggest to the person that they focus a little less on their own suffering and a little more on empathy for others and humility and recognition of their own role in creating their unhappiness. Obviously, there are some people who need to be helped to be less self-sacrificing and more assertive, but i think there is a group of people out there who are looking for affirmation of themselves as victims when that affirmation is not going to helpful to themselves or the people around them. Not everyone, probably not you, but certainly i have seen it.

Aine Kennedy's avatar

Agreed and not helped by the centrality of victimhood to woke ideology.

Elliot's avatar

An interesting point to an interesting point. The fact that both points are likely true just shows the messiness and complexity of this area. I suspect at the end of the day it just comes down to the individual in front of you that determines which lens you emphasize more

bindweed's avatar

Overall response: I really like the hypothesis, and I like how it clarifies the legitimate needs on different sides of the "overdiagnosis" debate--one being the need for expanded treatment, the other being the need for research to reflect the populations actually being treated. I think more consideration could be given to the reality that "underdiagnosis" advocates/movements are generally amongst those indifferent to clinical criteria, so "diagnostic stretching" is a more-accurate description of what they're advocating for. You paid a lot of attention to developing the distinction between "diagnostic stretching" and "overdiagnosis" frames, but not to the distinction between "diagnostic stretching" and "underdiagnosis", which I think in practice is minor at least for the diagnoses that the general public loves debating about.

I also really support the call for more research on treatments in different populations, although I'm skeptical that DSM categories are a good basis for determining treatment in the first place. But it's certainly harmful when research doesn't reflect the population the findings are being applied to.

I'd never heard of the research finding that less than half of people with bipolar disorder dx's in the 2000s actually met the criteria, but that certainly provides some perspective on something I've noted throughout my lifetime, which is that most the people I've known who had a bipolar disorder dx seemed to have been misdiagnosed as young people, later going off their meds with no ill-effects over many years. That's one of the things that led me to be skeptical of psychopharmaceuticals, since these are meds with high side-effects being given indefinitely to people who don't seem to need them. It's frustrating because almost all of these misdiagnosis cases probably just needed a good psychotherapist, and some recovered from their mood dysregulation through a non-medicalized process of personal growth and maturation. I'm sure the people who diagnosed them were trying to help, maybe to avoid a more-stigmatized personality disorder dx, but it harms a lot of people to delegitimize the field of psychiatry by not being honest about diagnoses!

Awais Aftab's avatar

Thank you! Good points.

Trysa Shulman, PsyD's avatar

Great points. And even when the diagnosis was “correct” at the time, people’s biology can change based upon diet, exercise, maturation, habits. It’s possible to correctly meet criteria at one point and then no longer meet criteria (some call this full remission).

Ruth Morin's avatar

This makes me think of Galatzer-Levy and Bryant’s 2013 paper on the 636,120 ways to meet criteria for PTSD. The purpose, of course, is to shine a light on the absurdity of the heterogeneity inherent in the diagnostic framework. But all I can think about these days is how impoverished our language (and, accordingly, our tools for treatment) are to describe the voluminous diversity of suffering we see in the clinic.

Awais Aftab's avatar

I think people make too much of the symptom combination heterogeneity; there is nothing absurd per se about it, if the phenomenon lends itself to such heterogenous presentations. Think of the diverse ways in which lupus/SLE can present! The bigger problem is that underneath that heterogeneity, we are not sure at all where the "right" distinctions are.

Trysa Shulman, PsyD's avatar

Yes, we need better distinctions based on common underlying factors (root causes) rather than than based on symptom presentation.

Ruth Morin's avatar

I’m curious to see how this will play out in psychiatric diagnoses. We are experiencing a reckoning with this exact “advancement” in the Alzheimer’s field (“era of biomarkers”) that has been super challenging clinically. Are we to make of every diverse symptom constellation some unique pathological signature of AD if someone has the biomarkers? Since there is a poor understanding of the base rates of these symptom presentations (and their neurobiological root cause, if one exists parsimonious) outside of the clinic and research settings (both biased in their own way), sticking with the distinction that combines utility for treatment and utility for understanding may be the best. I have a colleague that always says, as far as diagnoses are concerned, it just depends whether you’re a lumper or a splitter and for me it depends on the day/who’s on my caseload.

Eric's avatar

Guess I’m not sure how we are converging when the categories themselves are so mushy. It feels at risk of begging the question. I guess ‘adverse outcomes’ may be quantifiable in a real way, but psychiatric burden probably isn’t really. The ‘burden’ is subject to both conditions and cultural norms. What does it mean if “depression” is higher when considerable economic uncertainty is present? This doesn’t mean this depression shouldn’t be treated but I’d question if we are then converging on something fundamental, normative, or ‘real world,’ or instead something more circumstantial.

And culture defines a lot of this. Both expectations of how people will behave and what we should expect from our intrapsychic experiences are culturally defined. This doesn’t necessarily challenge all of your argument - we could be converging on cultural expectations and thereby benefiting the society - but it doesn’t seem like that’s what you’re arguing. I’m not sure from the post who legitimized distress, or maybe more precisely help-seeking, but the thirst for labels at present that is almost certainly culturally defined. Over half of the population of the UK is now ‘neurodivergent.’ I’m not sure if I understand what that means anymore. And this isn’t novel. There was significant prescription of amphetamines in the 1940s and 50s, not because we were concerned about attention issues, but because of a cultural norm around ‘pep.’ I’m sure this was scientifically dignified in various ways, but in the end the trend was cultural.

Awais Aftab's avatar

For me, there is no natural fact of the matter when it comes to medical vs non-medical problems/need. There is no natural boundary. It's all social and institutional, interacting with a complex spectrum of biology and psychology. More background here: https://www.psychiatrymargins.com/p/the-ground-beneath-the-clinic

Thomas Cook, M.D.'s avatar

With the breakdown of the nuclear family I have no doubt the average person is quite a bit more disturbed today than in the 1960s.

But in my opinion as any diagnosis can introduce iatrogenic harm, diagnostic threshold should not be objective across all generations… but should be in direct proportion to our ability to fix deep-seated problems. To diagnose is to involve yourself in treatment, otherwise it may cause harm, and although for example borderline traits are more common today, and psychiatrists as public health practitioners should comment on it, nevertheless, as people have gotten sicker a case can be made to pull back from diagnosis.

A diagnosis is like a Freudian interpretation: it is a stressor and may destabilize someone.

I spend a lot of time undiagnosing.

pmopenthread's avatar

Thank you for inviting us to comment on your preprint - I enjoyed reading it and I hope the response hasn't made you regret this exercise/experiment in academic transparency.

I think your hypothesis is somewhat stating the obvious… and that this a case in which the obvious should be stated! My non-expert least-bad guess would be that overdiagnosis is some messy combination of all-of-the-above and, to whatever extent that’s the case, the literature should include all-of-the-above.

“Stretching is a response to genuine clinical need interacting with official classifications that are too narrow, not too broad.”

~Can you clarify whether you are claiming that classifications are NOT too broad? Infamously , two patients can meet the DSM-V criteria for MDD without sharing a single symptom, meaning – even before any data-driven taxonomic analysis – the criteria cannot meet the requirements of a syndrome. (And then there IS Forbes et al...)~

[Edit: I saw another commenter brought up the PTSD study - since you got two similar responses, you may want to clarify the distinction you're making in your next draft.]

“This definition differs from how other authors have defined overdiagnosis. For example, Suzanne O’Sullivan (2025) defines overdiagnosis as a diagnosis that, while technically correct, does not benefit the patient and may do harm. The classical definition derived from cancer screening (a diagnosis of a condition that would never have caused symptoms or harm) transfers poorly to psychiatry, in my view, where diagnoses are symptom-defined and generally require current distress or impairment.”

Do you think there’s a consequentially large patient population for which the comparison to an incidentaloma is somewhat apt, eg, a patient with subclinical/borderline symptoms is given a diagnosis, due to expanded screening, and experiences net-harm? (In addition to medication side-effects, adopting a self-understanding/identification as mentally ill could increase impairment.)

Perhaps this falls under Premise 4, but are you considering patients who have partial symptoms of two codified syndromes, are as impaired as if they had either, and are diagnosed with both? (eg, anhedonia, avolition, and poor mood – which could co-occur with or be caused by almost anything other than mania (1), plus three other symptoms, resulting in a diagnosis of both depression AND a second condition)

Your 10.2 table includes “Specified diagnoses fall; unspecified rise” – to this layperson, it’s unclear whether “specified” is supposed to mean subtyped or, ironically, “NOS,” but are you considering scenarios in which either the inverse occurs or one remains constant and the other rises?

On the draft's prose, there’s some clunky writing that requires excessive effort to parse – for example:

“Depression. Pressure is more modest in the U.S. reimbursement system, because unspecified codes are generally reimbursed, but because clinical treatment guidelines are focused on major depression, that has become the favored diagnosis.”

“but because” gives the impression the clause will directly correct the prior clause and it’s unexpected for an author to make their point using clauses 3 and 4 of a four-clause sentence, rather than follow their point with qualifiers and caveats, so I was initially confused. If you're willing to substitute a parenthetical for a four-clause sentence in your academic writing, you could rewrite it, “(Pressure is more modest in the U.S. reimbursement system, because unspecified codes are generally reimbursed) Because clinical treatment guidelines are focused on major depression, that has become the favored diagnosis.”

If you’re using Claude as a proof-reader, you might want to try adding awkward grammar to its list of things for which to screen.

(1) What would you think about the idea that this symptom cluster is a failure mode exhibited by a wide variety of neuropsychiatric conditions, in addition to being characteristic of depression, a la Affective Medicine’s post about psychosis?

Thanks again for posting this - I look forward to your post on the finished paper!

Awais Aftab's avatar

Thank you for the comment!

“two patients can meet the DSM-V criteria for MDD without sharing a single symptom”

You are referring here to symptom heterogeneity which is a different matter than breadth. When I saw classifications are too narrow, I mean they exclude people who have relevant symptoms and have clinically significant distress/impairment but are excluded by the criteria.

“the criteria cannot meet the requirements of a syndrome”

I don’t think that’s a requirement for something to count as a syndrome.

“Do you think there’s a consequentially large patient population for which the comparison to an incidentaloma is somewhat apt, eg, a patient with subclinical/borderline symptoms is given a diagnosis, due to expanded screening, and experiences net-harm?”

Patient diagnosed solely because they were screened and who would not have come to clinical attention otherwise would constitute a situation similar to incidentaloma. It’s hard to say how much of increase in diagnoses is because of such screening. My impression is that it’s not a major driver, but I’m not certain.

“Specified” is referring to diagnoses with formal names and criteria, eg, major depression, bipolar disorder, basically diagnoses that aren’t NOS, other specified, or unspecified.

Ilana Kronick, Ph.D.'s avatar

Suffering is real, and the medical mandate to help has had positive intention and impact. The problem is that emotion is not a sickness, and never has been. We must normalize and understand emotional distress as a basic primal instinct that needs to be regulated, not a sickness that needs to diagnosed. You’re not sick when you’re emotional, you’re “on animal” —and it’s not your fault: it’s a function of being a living creature in need of surviving. Emotional states are a human condition, and how intense and frequently one has them depends on the degree to which validation and reassurance about having these states was achieved when developing. Emotional states are not complicated: they are the psychological extensions of our instinctive need to fundamentally protect ourselves, but since we are not typically in real need of physically protection, they are always exaggerated. Simplifying the human state of suffering as overreactive instinct, that needs validating but not pathologizing is the much needed direction for metal health.

Awais Aftab's avatar

Sure, emotions are not always sickness. I think from an evolutionary psychiatry perspective (e.g. Randy Nesse), one can talk about scenarios of a) emotional expressions/experiences that are adaptive/typical or do not otherwise generate clinically significant distress/impairment, b) emotional expressions/experiences that are excessive and do cause clinically significant distress/impairment, although there is technically no disorder present, and c) emotional expressions/experiences that represent genuinely dysregulated or dysfunctional. I think a lot of debate happens in the b) category. My stance is basically that if it is clinically significant and requires clinical intervention, even if the clinical intervention is some sort of supportive psychotherapy, it is a clinical problem.

Ilana Kronick, Ph.D.'s avatar

Thanks for your response. I agree with you that help is needed, but believe that medicalizing the process can be counterproductive. My clinical practice is founded on the simple and existential fact that emotion and the behaviors that emanate from it are fundamentally primal states for survival and, as such, are never diseases that need treatment. Emotional states are not psychological illnesses, they are simply the psychological extensions of instinctive moves for survival. When you’re emotional, you’re just “on animal”. Fight is anger, flight is shame, flinch is disgust, play-dead is sadness and freeze is fear. This may seem radically oversimplified, but it’s from working in hospitals for 14 years that I saw the need to simplify and de-pathologize the therapeutic approach. The intense experience of a reactive nervous system (overprotective and overcompensating) is of course a massive state of distress, disorientation and dysfunction, but to treat this as a maladaptive survival process rather an illness is extremely useful for change. People benefit from the simple, validating story: their instinct is reacting too much and this is not their fault (developmentally, they engaged it) but they are actually ok (not threatened in the wild) so this primal energy is not working for them. They learn that they are not sick, and that they have agency for change. Steps are made to contain the first impulsive and compulsive behaviors (addictions and social seeking) that feel necessary but aren’t effective, and then regulate the biological urges and the distorted psychological states that result from them through pointed mindfulness. Exploring and changing dysfunctional personality patterns, followed by acceptance of their primal behaviors and those of everyone else is the pathway to wellness.

Awais Aftab's avatar

What is your understanding of medicalization? Is it possible in theory to give a “diagnosis” that doesn’t medicalize — a psychological or psychoanalytic diagnosis, eg?

Ilana Kronick, Ph.D.'s avatar

This is precisely the issue: it is not possible to give a diagnosis that doesn’t medicalize. Reframing the problem of emotional suffering as one that is not a sickness in need of treatment, but rather a normal reaction in need of regulating, has shown to be an effective existential shift that yields positive results. Overall, it is possible that the issue of overdiagnosis is one that can be helped by significantly reducing the notion that psychological suffering needs treatment in a medical way. This is a huge existential undertaking.

My work and that of so many therapists (and from what I read, to some extent, your work as well) is founded on a sharp shift away from “having a disorder” to simply having normal primal reactivity in the name of survival, but given our civilized living, it being maladaptive.

Ultimately, the evolutionary story of emotion must be more of is a back-to-basics, Walter Canon-based model that emphasizes the fundamentals of fight or flight being ineffective in our daily living, more than them being adaptive evolutionary responses—they are not. In fact, our emotional responses are not useful at all, as they result from a survival system that is not required for everyday living and brings the overprotective, distorted of thinking of “being not ok”, even though, in evolutionary terms, the fact that you’re physically alive is proof of actually being ok.

All psychological states of distress are merely the psychological extensions of primal moves that our ancestors needed for their survival, but have little use for us now. Anger is fighting, shame is fleeing, disgust is flinching, depression is playing dead and fear is freezing. Our maladaptive responses in the name of relief (aggression, avoidance, etc) and the compensatory behaviors that seek gratification (addictions) are best met with containment and meditation since they are ultimately not necessary.

Individual differences and patterns in overreactivity are not due to illnesses, but the perceived need to engage defensive and compensatory strategies based on unmet validation and reassurances in childhood. Ultimately, parents need to show children that they are ok so that they don’t question it with unnecessary defenses. Mothers and fathers, as psychodynamics have shown, bring distinct reassurances and the lack of them result in distinct insecurities. Most diagnostic profiles in psychiatry can be linked to the basic lack of validation in development. So while everyone is emotional—it’s what you get for being an evolved animal—some people, due to unmet reassurances, are more emotional than others. But when you’re emotional, you’re not sick or crazy, you’re just “on animal” —and it’s not working for you.

Trysa Shulman, PsyD's avatar

When I treat patients who are suffering with whatever diagnosis, the underlying problem is never that the patients are “too emotional.” there are many ways that emotions get stuck and need to be given space to be felt expressed and processed. For other people, they don’t know how to tolerate their emotions and therefore go into all kinds of maladaptive avoidance of emotions and that can be what the underlying problem is.

I could go on and this is what my five types of depression framework is built on.

People really do suffer with mental disorders, but those mental disorders are never just a case of too many emotions.

Peter's avatar

For your own safety, please place your tongue firmly inside your cheek before reading the below. It's meant with peace and love and a great deal of humour.

Ground control to Major Awais, can you hear me? This is planet Earth, can you hear me? Come in, Major Awais. You've drifted past your navel, and if you drift any further from planet Earth you risk disappearing up your own backside.

I say that with the utmost respect. You care a lot and we need people like you.

I call it the Tommy Nookah syndrome, after a character from The Mighty Boosh who can’t stop turning even straightforward questions into endlessly recursive philosophical problems. Doctors, and indeed psychologists and occupational therapists and social workers and even dietitians these days, all have Tommy Nookah syndrome.

The DSM contains hundreds, hundreds, hundreds of functional disorders. Kant said do not make a rule unless you will that it be universally applied. If we applied such thinking elsewhere in medicine we would be a laughing stock. It's just a humiliating notion.

Look, people worry about all sorts of things. If they want to talk about it, there are counsellors and psychologists available. When you give such people a DSM diagnosis, you betray everything good science and medicine has ever stood for.

We need to bury the DSM in the deepest hole on Earth. Saying its criteria are too narrow is like saying hundreds of deck chairs on the Titanic are too narrow. The ship is sinking beneath us.

We need to get-a-grip. It's just not sensible. "Can people levitate?" "Can. People. Levitate?" The DSM is a deeply silly book. If we extrapolate arguments off it, such as the idea that its criteria are too narrow, we're trying to reason a turd into Shinola.

A good scientist has to know when to abandon, A.B.A.N.D.O.N., bad ideas. Flee from Babylon the Great, get out from under her false teachings, to use a biblical phrase. Nonsense begets nonsense. Grab hold of something firm.

No other medical profession engages in such brazen metaphysical babbling. Psychiatrists spend far too much of their time engaging in high-minded philosophising. It's disgraceful, elitist, privileged behaviour; perhaps they regret not pursuing philosophy.

It's also dishonest and a violation of the public trust. Medicine operates under a social contract: in exchange for extraordinary authority, the authority to diagnose illness, prescribe drugs, detain people in hospitals, certify incapacity, and call itself a branch of medical science, the public is entitled to expect that its diagnoses represent the best medical science available.

When a layperson accepts a DSM diagnosis from a doctor, they do so under that social contract. They reasonably understand that they are receiving a medical diagnosis, grounded as far as possible in medical science. They do not understand themselves to be participating in some bizarre philosophical exercise. There are other people they can go and see about those things: a priest, a psychologist, a counsellor, a psychoanalyst, a spiritual adviser, a life coach, a fortune teller, an astrologer, a village elder, a professor of philosophy if they so desire. People see a doctor on the basis that they will get a doctor.

Yes, Osler said "a touch of humbug," but seeing a doctor and getting a fortune teller is not a "touch" of humbug; it's a metric shit-tonne of humbug, and not what they signed up for.

There is no need to be pedantic about this. The public understands perfectly well that medicine is imperfect, that diagnoses change, that boundaries can be fuzzy and that science advances awkwardly. Arguments to the contrary are beard fallacies. The fact that we cannot identify the precise whisker at which stubble becomes a beard does not mean there is no meaningful distinction between a clean-shaven face and a great bushy beard. Likewise, the fact that medicine is imperfect and its boundaries sometimes uncertain does not erase the distinction between an endeavour grounded as far as possible in medical science and one grounded in philosophical speculation. What the public grants doctors is not infallibility but the expectation that the endeavour is as scientific and medically grounded as possible. You cannot claim the authority of medicine when giving the diagnosis and then, when challenged on its scientific basis, tell the patient that they misunderstood what "diagnosis" meant and start babbling about the metaphysical meaning of mental illness.

When a psychiatrist argues that it is the public who are mistaken, that the public simply misunderstand what psychiatric diagnoses are, it is a supreme arrogance. The misunderstanding, if it exists, has been produced by psychiatry's own use of medical language and medical authority. Doctors need to be the ones to pull their heads in. No one asked psychiatrists to diagnose 400+ functional disorders. That was an idea they invented, and it is an idea they can break free from. Flee from Babylon, flee from her false teachings, unless you wish to share in her fate.

Study the turd. Note its form, its stench, the way it glistens. Study the Shinola. Note that it comes in a tin and smells faintly of petroleum. When you, my son, can tell the shit from the Shinola, then you will be truly ready.

You are hopping about between two different opinions. Remember when Homer Simpson tried to reach up inside two vending machines and got both his arms stuck? That is you. Remember what the emergency services officer said to him? "Sir, are you still holding the can?" Let. Go. Of. The. Can.

Psychiatry has a Tommy Nooka problem. Imagine if you went to see an oncologist and before giving the diagnosis they stared wistfully off into the middle distance and said "but what really is cancer?". You would be running for the hills.

There is work to be done. We need people like you. You're useless to us with both hands shoved up... metaphysical vending machines.

As for the substance of your paper, it's a good paper in some ways, but you've correctly identified the wrong problem for your profession. If I wrote a paper as a peer worker arguing that an unmet medical need meant peer work should expand its scope to encompass medicine, I would be eviscerated for role drift. It would be out of my scope, out of my lane. The fact that I encounter the problem does not make it my profession's problem to solve. So I plan to retrain.

The same applies here. You have identified people with genuine problems and genuine unmet needs. Fine. But genuine need does not mean medical need, and the fact that these people have historically ended up in front of psychiatrists does not establish that psychiatry has any proper claim over them. It's a quirk of history that psychiatry has acquired the power to be involved in this territory. That power does not establish jurisdiction, and it certainly does not entitle psychiatry to stretch the boundaries of medicine until every human problem fits inside them.

If the problem is that people cannot access social support, educational accommodations, disability assistance or other forms of help without acquiring a medical diagnosis, then that's a social and political problem. We cannot not solve it by requiring psychiatry to invent increasingly expansive ways of describing people as patients. The solution to society requiring a medical label for non-medical needs is not to manufacture more medical labels, that is insane.

I'm not saying you can't notice this problem or comment on it. The painter should absolutely point out the giant crack running through the building. But if the painter discovers that every building he paints has giant structural cracks, he faces a choice: remain a painter and alert the engineers, or retrain as an engineer. He doesn't expand the definition of painting until structural engineering falls within his scope.

So if you're serious about tackling the problems outlined in this paper, go and get a Master of Social Policy and become a Social Policy Adviser. I'm not being facetious. I mean it. You might be very good at it. But if this is the problem you want to spend your career solving, perhaps you're in the wrong vocation.

Sorry to be so harsh. I think its a tremendous thing that you wrote and prepared this article. You deserve a medal. But I have to give you my honest opinion.

Awais Aftab's avatar

Thank you for your thoughts. Much to say here but the basic point is that I am not advocating for giving medical labels to non-medical needs just for the sake of it. However, I am not convinced that there is a fact of the matter when it comes to medical vs non-medical problems/need. There is no natural boundary. It's all social and institutional interacting with a complex spectrum of biology and psychology. For me, the fundamental reference point is clinical significance. A presentation is clinically significant when it (a) comes to clinical attention and (b) is judged by a clinician to be appropriate for clinical intervention. It becomes a clinical problem. There are of course all sorts of legitimate ways in which society can reduce the scope of clinical significance. If they can provide effective alternative sources of help, then fewer of those issues would come to clinical attention. If accommodations or supports can be provided without clinician involvement, go ahead. I don't oppose that at all. Build effective alternatives to clinical professions. But for me that doesn't take away the legitimacy of a person seeking help and a clinician agreeing that help is appropriate.

Peter's avatar

OK zoomer.

Joking, sorry. I know you don't have in mind frivolous diagnoses nor would you be frivolous in practice.

Is it an issue with reality not having clear enough boundaries, or is it something to do with your perception? I don't know how to reach you from ground control. It's like you're on another planet. I'm not talking about perfectly crisp lines, but it seems like you live in a reality where everything is a giant mass of jello and you're drifting amongst it. Sorry, that is a bit mean of me, in many ways your light touch on truth is a strength and I admire your open mindedness but you know what they say about being too open minded. What I notice in your writing is that this wishy-washiness isn't limited to one area or topic. It's peppered throughout your writing, which makes me wonder whether it's become an entrenched way of thinking rather than a conclusion you've reached independently in each case. I guess what I mean is: you're a fuzzy writer, and if that fuzzy writing reflects your thinking, maybe you're a little too predisposed to seeing fuzziness everywhere. Maybe you need to change it up a bit and try on some different lenses. I have doubts too, but I figure you cannot go about seeking clarity on the basis of pessimism. I guess you could say I'm an optimist when it comes to seeking answers. I set out to find things not to not find anything, if that makes sense. If there is nothing to be found so be it but I don’t pull my boots on and go looking to declare the absence of things. I don't go bird watching to look at the trees and write books on birds about how there are no birds.

Look, the DSM has hundreds of heterogeneous diagnoses. If nothing else, we can't have more of that. I can't remember that many things for a start. I can see the sense in pursuing dimensional systems. They're not my cup of tea, but I can see some value.

I might have gone a bit overboard with the first comment. I was trying to be hyperbolic to make a point. I do agree, in a sense, that a doctor looks after people's health, and that can take many forms. Clinical care should never be dogmatic or rigid.

I've been thinking about what sort of pressure is behind this problem, and I can't help but think public health policy is a driver of this desire for fuzzier boundaries. I wonder if it's a function of an overly rigid healthcare system with algorithms, guidelines and insurance companies. Maybe. I don't know enough about those things. I think of the small-town doctors I knew in my youth, though, and the way they practised, and I have this sense that they didn't face these sorts of conundrums.

Here in Australia, I can access basic mental health care without needing a mental illness diagnosis. It's nothing too flashy: you can get a limited number of sessions with a psychologist through Medicare, and I can also go to my regular GP who, depending on the GP, may prescribe something like Prozac without insisting on specialist referral. That's reasonably good basic mental healthcare for the garden-variety mixed anxiety and depression people commonly experience. It could be much better, and people should be able to access more, but to me it points towards part of the answer: basic mental healthcare for all without requiring a mental illness diagnosis.

I think the lack of that may be part of the problem. From the outside, my impression is that in the US insurance codes matter a great deal, and that having a diagnosis can make it easier to get coverage. There may be all sorts of exceptions and workarounds I don't understand, but if that basic picture is right, then I can see how the system itself might create pressure towards diagnosis. Fair enough. I don't believe in ever being dogmatic. On a case-by-case basis, I don't have a major moral objection to a kind-hearted doctor slightly stretching things to help a family in need. That has always been part of medicine and, in some ways, part of a functional community: people making reasonable judgements and small adjustments to make life liveable.

I vaguely recall this being more the way things worked here in the late 90s and early 00s. It wasn't rigid, but it wasn't a free-for-all either. Doctors made reasonable judgements based on evidence and sound clinical reasoning. There also wasn't excessive pressure to give the patient whatever diagnosis they wanted. It was a judgement call, not "shared decision-making." I think that is OK.

But stretching major diagnoses, say bipolar disorder, major depression or ADHD, is a different matter. To me, that is a bad idea and potentially a disaster. The aim with those should be validity. That is what I want as a healthcare consumer. It's my body, and I want diagnoses that are as valid as reasonably possible, caveats and all, for anything that goes wrong with it.

So the better answer has to be policy change that allows people to access basic mental healthcare without having to be squeezed into a rigid diagnostic category.

One option would simply be to waive the need for a diagnosis. Another would be to have some broad category that essentially means general mental health problems, analogous, very loosely, to recognising poor diet, lack of exercise or unhealthy alcohol use as health problems without pretending they constitute some specific underlying disease. Insurance policy would then have to ensure that this was sufficient for coverage. Hell, you could get rid of the other DSM diagnoses, just keep the dozen or so real ones, and number 13 can be "general mental health problems."

And again, speaking as an outsider, this doesn't seem completely alien to the way American healthcare already works. As I understand it, insurers are already required in various areas to cover certain forms of care even where there isn't a neat, discrete disease diagnosis at the centre of it. If that is right, then the principle seems fairly straightforward: people can need healthcare without having a specific disease. So why should basic mental healthcare be different? You could recognise general mental health problems as enough to justify a modest amount of basic care, without forcing the clinician to manufacture a more specific psychiatric disorder.

Universal basic mental healthcare would be a good start. These sorts of solutions seem much better in the long run than jamming everyone into the DSM and labelling everyone mentally ill. Maybe I'm naive. Maybe American healthcare is so far down the toilet that distorting the DSM is the only viable answer within anyone's lifetime. But if diagnostic inflation is partly being driven by the need to unlock care, then surely the more sensible target is the system that makes a diagnosis the price of admission.

Afrayem “Fry” Morgan's avatar

Thank you for writing the comment I wanted to find.

Laurentiu Lupu MD's avatar

Your hypothesis makes one cost of stretching easier to see. A stretched diagnosis arrives with the full story of the specified category attached: its usual course, its treatments, its expectations. The person whose distress sits below the threshold, or beside it, receives that story too, and may begin reading their life through it. A classification that named what they actually have might meet the need without importing a narrative written for someone else.

Zaidan Idrees Choudhary's avatar

I think psychiatry faces the paradoxical problem of both underdiagnosis and overdiagnosis. Depression and bipolar disorder can still go unrecognized, despite being conditions for which we have some of the most established treatments. At the same time, we see potential overdiagnosis of Neurodevelopmental conditions or Personality disorders where treatment is often not straight forward.

Adam Kritzer's avatar

I agree with this and put another way, eeryone's suffering is unique, and few people suffer in a "normative" way. In that sense, it's obviously not realistic to hope that the DSM will ever have diagnosed at categories that perfectly capture anyones suffering.

If I understand Aftab's argument correctly, It is that there are many people suffering with certain conditions that might benefit from a formal diagnosis of that condition, but unfortunately don't meet the diagnostic threshold. And right now given the rigidity of the DSM system, there is no "official" way around this. Hence the need for some more flexibility to make sure that all of those that would benefit from a diagnosis actually receive one.

Aussie Med Student's avatar

We have a philosophical disagreement (I think)... I don't think that having clinically significant distress or impairment is an adequate justification for a psychiatric diagnosis, and also I don't think a diagnosis should be a prerequisite for attention ('treatment')... at least not for psychological treatment, which I'd tend to put under the banner of useful life skills/strategies that shouldn't require a psychiatric label to access. Just like medical treatment is something physically healthy people get all the time (eg vaccination, well baby checks) so psychological therapies should also be routinely accessed by people who view themselves as fundamentally mentally healthy individuals who are accessing as-needed support.

We need to unstick mental distress from mental illness. The need to legitimise and validate psychic distress with a mental illness label. I'm one who doesn't think the diagnostic inflation has served our culture well. I'd far rather view myself as a normal human being experiencing normal everyday human distress, than as someone with a mental illness (for the ubiquitous depression and anxiety and associated ills of everyday life) - let alone be told that I have to get a mental illness label before anyone will help me, let alone acknowledge my distress. (I suspect this dynamic is behind much of the drive towards overdiagnosis.)

Plus, I don't think you've authentically characterised the position of Allen Frances and his ilk.

Awais Aftab's avatar

I'd say that in my view clinically significant distress or impairment that requires clinical intervention of some sort is an adequate justification for a clinical diagnosis, although whether that diagnosis should be characterized as a state of "disorder" or "illness" will depend on what definition of disorder we are using. That is, I see diagnosis (and the domain of clinical problems) as being a broader domain than that of disorder.

Whether a formal diagnosis *should* be a prerequisite for psychological treatment or accommodation, etc, is a different question. I don't have a particularly strong opinion about it, and I am not in principle opposed to it.

Steven Reidbord's avatar

I read your preprint, and as usual I'm impressed with the depth of your analysis. My concern is that you attribute increased help-seeking to "increased awareness," as though public education were the cause.

I'm dubious. It seems more likely that self-labeling lends legitimacy to one's distress. This is in keeping with identity trends in our culture, where labeling oneself as a member of an oppressed or disadvantaged group is social currency. E.g., nothing is gained by being socially awkward or scatterbrained, but being "on the spectrum" or an "ADHDer" confers legitimacy, community, claims to treatment, a soapbox for lived experience... and perhaps most important, a comforting concretizing of one's problems.

I then see diagnostic stretching, which I agree is quite real, as a reaction to this increased perceived need. It's hard to turn away patients seeking help. And influencers on social media are more than happy to fill the void.

Medicalizing emotional distress is not the fault of the DSM. Culture determines what counts. That doesn't mean emotional distress wasn't troubling or debilitating before—maybe you're right that it's on par with the headaches and backaches seen in general medicine. What we, and our colleagues in primary care, do about that is another question.

Awais Aftab's avatar

Self-diagnosis is kind of a parallel story; often it operates without any clinical contact at all or some very superficial contact. It does feed into the overdiagnosis question IMO when the diagnosis is endorsed by a clinician and treated as a legitimate clinical problem. It is difficult to say how much of this "perceived need" is baseless; it's hard to even evaluate because once you start approaching perceived need with skepticism, there is nothing stopping you from treating the vast majority of perceived need as illegitimate unless it causes impairment that is clear to others (i.e. the historically insane and intellectually disabled). This is why I think clinical significance and comparison of burden with physical medicine are probably the best options available.

bindweed's avatar

You claim in the article that when people who meet full criteria don't present for treatment, it's most often because they don't perceive a need for it, but that doesn't match my experiences based on talking to people. Even if they say they don't need it, it's often clear that they do in fact see a need and have considered treatment but are afraid. And I think their fear is often *correct* based on risk-assessment of full criteria vs subthreshold individuals--people with more severe symptoms are more likely to face involuntary commitment or to be pressured into treatment with riskier drugs or at higher doses or polypharmacy. There is also more intrapersonal and interpersonal risk to having to grapple with their behavior and belief system as potentially being a set of *symptoms* rather than legitimate choices/viewpoints. So it makes sense that at one point, when the social risk of mental health treatment was high, milder cases presented much less often than severe cases, but now the situation is reversed--the risk for people with milder cases is low.

I do think that insight and relative degree of attachment security is a factor that favors help-seeking by people with less severe psychopathology, but we shouldn't pretend that the risk treatment-avoidant people with severe pathology sense is entirely fake, or that most of them don't have the spector of treatment and diagnosis hovering somewhere in the corner of their minds.

ETA: People with more severe psychopathology are also at higher risk of abuse by a medical/mental health professional professional or just poor-fit treatment because they lack the skills to advocate for themselves, manage relationships in general, or conceptualize what good treatment for themselves would look like. It makes sense to adopt a default strategy of isolation and self-reliance, or perhaps dependence on one person (such as a romantic partner) which at least reduces the perimeter of risk.

ETA2: I would go so far as to argue that many cases of "lack of insight" are in fact cases where motivated reasoning blocks insight based on fear of diagnosis and/or treatment. I've heard that we see this with physical disorders as well, e.g. medical professionals who know the signs of skin cancer delaying getting a truly worrying mole looked at for longer than lay people who can expect the average answer to be that there's no concern.

ETA3: Oh and the obvious additional factor that not seeking treatment can be due to poverty, with either no accessible treatment or only lower-quality treatment that reinforces the idea that treatment will be ineffective at best and harmful at worse. I think a lot of the hand-wringing around "overdiagnosis" comes from seeing class disparities in diagnosis, especially diagostic stretching, where it's hard to take seriously how the most-resourced individuals/families are being diagnosed with disabilities that the lower classes just have to struggle with on their own (despite a higher actual burden of impairment).

ETA4: And of course the untreated individuals who live in poverty may also have significant cultural differences or expect to be seen by doctors/therapists through supremacist lenses of white cisheteropatriarchy that further make the risk-reward assessment of seeking treatment worse. Treatment may also occur via a model that does not match their value systems.

I just personally hear these kinds of objections way more often than I see people who are in significant distress deny that what they are experiencing is something that needs treatment. And the ones who deny tend to deny in a way that makes it clear they *know*--maybe they were institutionalized in the past and don't want to go back, or are clinging to mania as the only reprieve from a dreary life and don't want to risk having that taken away and replaced with flatness, medications with limited efficacy, stigma, and medication side effects that might make them feel even worse about themselves. Maybe they just shut down the conversation because they don't want to risk iatrogenic harm, based on past experiences of pervasive harm from people/institutions with greater power than them.

Lark Evermore's avatar

As a patient, I have been on both sides of this debate. I have a rare mental illness-related condition and I was profoundly relieved when I learned it had a name, yet another time I felt unfairly labeled and diminished when a nurse practitioner gave me a new diagnosis.

There is a solution to this disagreement: Our government awards disability benefits based not on diagnoses, but on symptoms and how they impair functioning. Why can’t psychiatry treat based on that? It’s because it would put an end to the DSM and that would be opposed by entrenched interests.

Awais Aftab's avatar

Symptoms plus impaired functioning is essentially what a diagnosis is. You can choose not to use the name but the ingredients are all there! It's like saying "we can measure the blood pressure and we can treat it if it's high enough, but why do we have to really give it a diagnostic label?"

Lark Evermore's avatar

But diagnoses in psychiatry are much more imprecise than they are in general medicine. Why label it something when you’re not sure exactly what “it” is?