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Robert Chapman's avatar

Its only unbearable from a medical model perspective. For those who take more of a cultural view the diversity is a positive. I think both views have their use in different contexts, although the former has only very limited relevant contexts.

Maia Szalavitz's avatar

I'm probably one of the people they think have "fake" autism because I'm socially warm. What that hides is that I had intense sensory and emotional overload starting from early childhood— so much so that my mom took me to see a child psychiatrist when I was 3 in 1968. (no one did that then!) Unbeknownst to me at the time, I was diagnosed with ADHD and "hyperesthesia"— known to me I was diagnosed as "gifted" because I was reading at 3 also. I didn't like to be touched, had repetitive compulsive behaviors that I sought to hide and didn't like change. I took everything literally; before puberty, I was focused almost exclusively on ideas and reading and my particular obsessions (scifi and opera) rather than people. Was bullied, excluded etc until I realized that being obsessed with drugs was an obsession other people my age did share. What would you call that if not autism spectrum disorder? Should the spectrum be divided by IQ, even though it's really difficult to actually test in severe cases even if it may actually be high? I don't know. All I know is that being diagnosed with OCD, ADHD, depression, various addictions and even once bipolar made far less sense to me than having an underlying condition of autism via which oversensitivity led to self medication via repetitive behavior and obsessive interests and later, drugs. (And thanks Awais for your contributions to the piece I wrote about this for the New York Times, which can be found here: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/05/opinion/mental-health-diagnosis-labels.html?unlocked_article_code=1.GVE.80Ex.FmHG28JTFoLI&smid=url-share )

The Connected Mind's avatar

I’ve reread this a couple of times now, and I find myself agreeing with so much of it. Your description of the blurriness of psychopathology, recognition that sometimes there isn’t a distinct syndrome, and insistence on taking suffering seriously without pretending to certainty all seem exactly right to me, and so consistent with the humane, curious, pluralistic approach I appreciate in your writing.

But I struggle with the suggestion that those of us concerned about autism’s expansion are nostalgic for a narrower construct, incurious about unfamiliar presentations, insufficiently empathic toward patients’ suffering, or (maybe most kindly?) don’t understand how spectra work.

I wonder if I can explain why, from where I’m standing, the skeptical position feels like almost the opposite: the more curious, more empathic, and ultimately more pragmatic position.

Let me borrow your blurry photograph analogy, perhaps to the point of absurdity. :) Let’s say we’re trying to determine whether a photograph is of Barack Obama. We can begin with two entirely reasonable premises. First, Obama doesn’t always look exactly the same. He looked different as a child, and photos taken on the same day vary with lighting, angle, and expression. This is the heterogeneity of a syndrome: we shouldn’t expect every presentation to resemble a single prototype. Second, sometimes photographs are blurry. We may not confidently distinguish him from a lookalike. That’s diagnostic uncertainty, using imperfect indicators without a definitive test.

I agree with both premises! But I worry that somewhere along the way, we’ve made a strange substitution. We began by looking for Obama, recognized that some pictures of Obama are blurry, and gradually started treating blurriness itself as evidence of Obama. Now we’re looking at blurry photographs of lighthouses, trees, comets, and possibly Joan of Arc, insisting they must be Obama, because Obama is a spectrum. Wait… what? Why are we insisting on this?

Of course, that’s a caricature, and certainly not what you’re advocating. But I think something like this substitution has been happening in the clinical conceptualization of autism. We began with recognizable social-communication impairments and restricted/repetitive behaviors, acknowledged their variability, then broadened what counts as evidence of those very characteristics. We went from a reasonable hypothesis (caterpillars and butterflies look different but are the same animal; maybe these presentations are phenotypes of one syndrome) to broadening the qualifying features rather than testing it: moths, birds, bats, airplanes, anything fuzzy or fond of flowers…

“Social-communication impairment” can now be inferred from introversion, social exhaustion, awkwardness, alienation, social anxiety, environmental mismatches, perfectionism, discomfort with eye contact, or feeling misunderstood. Restricted interests can become passionate hobbies; insistence on sameness a preference for predictability; masking can sometimes allow the absence of recognizable features to be interpreted as evidence of their concealed presence. These experiences occur in autism, but also across a tremendous range of temperaments, difficulties, histories, and ordinary human predicaments. They don’t necessarily differentiate autism.

So the concern isn’t simply that the photographs have become blurrier, or that we’re recognizing less familiar pictures of Obama. It’s that the features we’re using to recognize Obama have become so nonspecific that they no longer reliably distinguish him from anything else. Repeating that Obama looks different in different photographs, or that genuine pictures of him can be blurry, doesn’t address this. I agree about difficult boundary cases! But semantic similarity between descriptions isn’t evidence we’re looking at the same subject. Not everything with wings or a fondness for flowers is a butterfly!

This matters precisely because I am curious about what’s in the pictures. Some may represent overlooked autism; others anxiety, temperament, trauma, depression, attention, personality, environment, adaptations, or their interactions. Some may be patterns we don’t yet understand. Why wouldn’t we want to preserve the possibility that these are different things? Especially when developmental courses, impairment patterns, co-occurring conditions, outcomes, needs, gender ratios, and research findings also vary?

Which brings me to the pragmatic argument: maybe I’m asking the wrong questions. Maybe instrumental rationality (what helps) matters more than epistemic rationality (what’s true). Does butterfly versus bird versus kite matter if we want to help this individual soar? I get that impulse; practical exigencies do shape diagnosis. And yet… I worry that, in some settings, late-diagnosed autism is becoming shorthand for complexity: real distress or difficulty, often involving the social world, that doesn’t readily yield to familiar explanations. The picture is blurry. What do we gain by calling it Obama? The person deserves help either way. Such heterogeneous grouping may obscure what distinguishes autism, which research findings apply, and how to understand people whose difficulties have different origins.

Which brings us to empathy. What matters more than the humaneness of care? I agree that someone who doesn’t fit existing categories may be suffering enormously, and that our classification system shouldn’t become an excuse to withhold help. But I’m not convinced that extending a particular diagnosis is necessarily the most compassionate response.

Clinicians may mean “complex” and “deserving of attention,” but autism is often heard as “fully explained” and “requires accommodation from the world,” not as a modest description of uncertain experiences. It comes with an explanatory narrative, increasingly a neurobiological one: this is how your brain is wired; this is the kind of person you are. I know you don’t endorse that simplistic essentialism. But it’s common in how the diagnosis is understood and communicated.

That may offer relief and recognition when it fits. But when uncertain, it can collapse a complex explanatory landscape into one story. Your own writing reminds us that temperament, development, relationships, environments, bodies, habits, adaptations, values, and circumstances are all relevant. Some constraints endure, others change; some deficits are adaptations; entrenched patterns may have unexpected leverage points. We barely understand their nonlinear interactions. Of course, I’m a neuropsychologist, so I agree brains are involved! But that doesn’t make “a differently wired brain” a sufficiently informative explanation, much less the only one.

This is where I find the tension with your broader commitment to explanatory pluralism striking. We’ve seen how poorly overly tidy explanations—depression as a “chemical imbalance,” for example—serve patients and science. Even compassionately offered, a settled explanation may narrow what patients imagine possible and what clinicians investigate. We may miss opportunities to discover what helps.

I understand the appeal of your provisional language: “autistic features with…” and so forth (“butterflies where there’s no evidence there was ever a caterpillar”; “butterflies that seem to have feathers”). It seems to preserve uncertainty. But I’m increasingly unsure what another clinician means by “autistic features.” Even qualified language risks perpetuating the ambiguity.

What if we became more comfortable simply saying what we mean? This person has these social difficulties, this temperament, sensory sensitivities, responses to demands, strengths, vulnerabilities, and problems-in-living. Some suggest autism; others different formulations. The category may be uncertain even when the difficulties are real. And when we label everything a butterfly to affirm suffering, don’t we risk implying we’re only interested in suffering if the patient convinces us their pain comes in particular shapes?

Perhaps this sounds unrealistic when people need help today. But humility and pluralism can help under constrained conditions. Physical therapists work pragmatically with complex pain and movement difficulties, considering physiology, injury, environment, movement patterns, compensations, demands, and preferences. Without necessarily identifying one category, they hypothesize, try small changes, observe, adjust, and find leverage points. (What part of soaring or visiting flowers is hard for you, and what can we try to help you reach your goals, or if necessary set new ones?)

I’m not suggesting all psychological suffering should be treated as undifferentiated need, or that diagnoses have no value, or that people with milder difficulties deserve less help (or that decisions should be based on level of need, Fonagy-report style). Quite the opposite. We might sometimes provide better help by resisting the temptation to make a category do more explanatory work than it can bear.

Perhaps the kindest thing we can sometimes say is: “I can see that this picture is blurry. I don’t know exactly what it depicts, and perhaps we never will. But let’s keep looking carefully, considering different possibilities, and trying the next small adaptive move together.”

To me, that’s not a retreat from curiosity, empathy, or pragmatism. It’s an expression of all three.

Joe Shirley's avatar

If the ground keeps moving beneath our feet, maybe we're not actually standing on "ground." What is it like to be Holden Thorp or Uta Frith? We really have no clear idea of that, and until we gain the ability to train subjects in how to bring disciplined, high-resolution, precise observation to their first-person subjective experience in a way that enables us to actually discern patterns that stand firm, we have no good maps. Our current diagnostic categories are not good maps.

Percy Yarrow's avatar

The line that the field cannot tell "measurement is no longer possible" from "the concept no longer applies" holds for one sitting, and the first horn has a reference: Spitzer's LEAD standard takes the longitudinal record, with collateral, as the criterion a single interview is checked against. The blur seems to me a property of the first assessment more than of autism. The record I can put behind that is narrow: in toddlers aged 16 to 30 months at US specialist centres, 70.2% of expert diagnoses were made with complete certainty, and the uncertainty clustered in mid-level ADOS-2 scores, the middle of the pixelated photo. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC9672659/ That is a measure of how sure clinicians felt, in toddlers; the adults in question are another population. For adults the time that matters runs backwards, into a developmental history that is often gone. So I grant the second horn: when psychopathology sits high on every dimension, more record gives the label nothing to attach to. LEAD narrows one horn and never reaches the other.

Ruth Morin's avatar

This is so well reasoned. I’ve seen an uptick in geriatric patients with mild cognitive impairment/specific executive dysfunction that includes rigidity asking if they have autism without any obvious developmental history and I guess part of where I land is theoretical parsimony and clinical utility? I’m usually just trying to understand how the label or the idea of the diagnosis functions as a way of understanding self and self-in-context.