“Psychiatry has historically seen a few big explanations, most notably the discovery of the spirochete for general paresis. It is highly unlikely that spirochete-like big explanations remain to be discovered for major psychiatric disorders.”
Kenneth Kendler (2005), Toward a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry
Freddie deBoer, borrowing from fellow psychiatry substacker Martin Greenwald, articulated psychiatry’s “syphilis problem” on his Substack earlier this week. The problem goes like this: when a condition we call “mental disorder” is found to have a definitive physiological cause, such as an infection or a tumor, the condition relocates to the domain of another specialty. It becomes recognized as a neurological, or infectious, or oncological problem, and gets treated by physicians from those specialties. As a result, psychiatry’s visible record is weighted towards what remains unsolved, putting psychiatry at a permanent reputational disadvantage.
DeBoer characterizes this as the syphilis problem because the prime example is general paresis of the insane, a common condition in psychiatric asylums in the 19th century, that at the beginning of the 20th century was identified to be a late manifestation of syphilis, caused by the spirochete Treponema pallidum. It was a big deal for the psychiatric profession, but the condition basically disappeared once antibiotics became common.
DeBoer frames the problem primarily as a reputational one for psychiatry, “a kind of branding issue for a field,” but there are deeper conceptual issues that require sorting out. The major question: is this picture even true for mental disorders? Is psychiatry’s domain a collection of undiagnosed bodily pathologies, waiting to be scooped up by other medical specialties? Is the goal of psychiatry to make itself redundant? Once we figure out what all the mental disorders are, we get to pack it up and close shop?
As these conceptual things often go, we can trace the debate back to our good friend and arch nemesis Thomas Szasz himself. Szasz, for all his flaws, articulated a definitional dilemma that even well-intentioned psychiatrists and psychiatry defenders find hard to escape.
In his 1960 article, The Myth of Mental Illness, Szasz wrote:
“The assumption is made that some neurological defect, perhaps a very subtle one, will ultimately be found for all the disorders of thinking and behavior. Many contemporary psychiatrists, physicians, and other scientists hold this view…
I have tried to show that for those who regard mental symptoms as signs of brain disease, the concept of mental illness is unnecessary and misleading. For what they mean is that people so labeled suffer from diseases of the brain; and, if that is what they mean, it would seem better for the sake of clarity to say that and not something else.”
In 2011, he reiterated this argument:
“Such a process of biological discovery has, in fact, characterised some of the history of medicine, one form of “madness” after another being identified as the manifestation of one or another somatic disease, such as beriberi or neurosyphilis. The result of such discoveries is that the illness ceases to be a form of psychopathology and is classified and treated as a form of neuropathology. If all the conditions now called mental illnesses proved to be brain diseases, there would be no need for the notion of mental illness and the term would become devoid of meaning.”
“For what they mean is that people so labeled suffer from diseases of the brain; and, if that is what they mean, it would seem better for the sake of clarity to say that and not something else.” Damn!
Now, Szasz and serious-mental-illness-is-a-brain-disease advocates are on opposite sides of this logic (Szasz thought they were problems in living), but both agree on the terms of this binary. For many biological psychiatrists, “mental disorder” is a placeholder concept; these are bodily diseases—like syphilis, like Parkinson’s, like Huntington’s—we just haven’t figured out what they are.
Fortunately for us, we don’t have to accept these terms of debate. Brain disease and problems in living are not our only options. I happen to genuinely believe there is such a thing as “psychopathology,” neither brain disease nor problems of living but a secret third thing. It is “psychopathology” that is the proper domain of psychiatry, and psychopathology is not a collection of undiagnosed localized bodily lesions.
One clue to this is that over the past 150 years or so, general paresis of the insane (neurosyphilis) remains one of the very few examples where a major psychiatric syndrome, which had its own name and its own place in the classification, turned out to be a bodily disease. Other examples would include Pellagra, Korsakoff’s psychosis, and Rett’s disorder. These cases mostly clustered in the early 20th century and have become rarer since.
However, we have many, many examples of psychiatric symptoms arising secondary to some other disease, e.g. autoimmune encephalitis, but these are typically rare cases at the margins of the syndrome. This sort of scenario is actually fairly common across medicine. There is primary (idiopathic) epilepsy, but we also have secondary epilepsy due to infections, metabolic disorders, genetic mutations, etc. The secondary epilepsies stay within neurology. There is primary (essential) hypertension, but we also have secondary hypertension due to endocrine disorders, kidney disorders, etc. Similarly, we have primary psychosis or primary mania, but people can also develop psychosis or mania due to an assortment of neurological, immunological, and metabolic disorders. This is why psychiatry has a whole subfield, traditionally called “organic psychiatry,” now a combination of neuropsychiatry and medical psychiatry, dealing with secondary causes of psychopathological symptoms. These conditions are even in the DSM and ICD. Psychiatrists are routinely involved in their treatment and sometimes even assume primary responsibility for treating them. They are no threat to psychiatry’s reputation or value; if anything, they enhance it in academic medical centers.
So what’s going on with all the “non-organic” mental disorders? The biggest limitation here is a lack of imagination. Similar to Szasz, people seem to have a hard time imagining what an etiological explanation of mental illness could look like that isn’t a brain tumor or reaction to adversity.
When it comes to mental disorders, we often have to think about dysfunctional patterns rather than broken parts. We are dealing with sticky behavioral and experiential patterns that come with all sorts of negative consequences for a person’s life and functioning. These patterns are related to the way the physiological components are configured, and that configuration exists in the context of the coupling between a person and the world.
Let’s take some hypothetical toy examples for illustrative purposes only:
Depression as a self-sustaining symptom network that settles into an attractor state stabilized by the interaction of neuroticism and social adversity.
An emotionally dysregulated-relationally sensitive syndrome (aka “borderline personality”) arising from a temperamental vulnerability towards mood reactivity meeting an invalidating developmental environment, with downstream problems in mentalization.
Psychosis as aberrant predictive processing in the brain, a dysfunction existing at the algorithmic level in the brain, which can be realized in different ways by the neural machinery, and which arises often in the context of neurodevelopmental abnormalities and life adversities (that are not, by themselves, necessary or sufficient).
These are situations where there is no localized lesion and where these problems cannot be conceptualized as simple consequences of a difficult life. Each specifies a particular sort of dysfunctional mechanism that isn’t a brain disease in the sense of neurosyphilis or glioblastoma. They are not “metaphorical” dysfunctions. And the reason they stay in psychiatry (along with clinical psychology) is because no other medical field has the expertise to deal primarily with dysfunctional behavioral and experiential patterns, that arise from gene-environment interactions, are interwoven with personality, and are linked to psychological development.
Psychiatry is not a leftover category. It is not a wastebasket of cases like neurosyphilis, beriberi, and erethism that we haven’t identified yet. It’s a medical specialty dedicated to psychopathology, to problems of the “mind” that span the physiological-experiential-sociocultural-existential. It is a medical specialty that holds neuroscience in one hand and psychology in the other. Because these patterns are embodied—realized physiologically—they can be addressed in part via various biological levers. For that reason, treatment modalities such as psychiatric medications and neuromodulation remain a vital part of the clinical armamentarium, but their utility varies from situation to situation.
The reputational problem of syphilis-like discoveries is a predicament only if we assume that mental disorders are, by and large, undiagnosed localized pathologies; once we give that up, the challenge largely dissolves.
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