This is a very interesting discussion, Awais--thank you! As you know, there is not much new in what is asserted by the authors you cite. Most of what they are arguing goes back to the British emergentist philosophers, such as J.S. Mill; and to the later (related) concept of supervenience, championed by Donald Davidson and others. These remain controversial theories, of course. [1]
From my perspective of "ontological monism and explanatory pluralism," nobody had a better take on the mind-body conundrum than Baruch Spinoza. He envisioned a single substance [hence, ontological monism] whose properties (attributes) could be viewed in either physical or mental terms--not two separate substances of "mind" and "brain," or "mind" and "body" (contra Descartes). That is, "...for Spinoza there is only one substance: God [or Nature]. Nonetheless, mind and body are different attributes of this one substance." [2]
Even better, in my view, is Aristotle's view of "mind" (psyche) as a set of faculties or abilities; e.g., perception, calculation, imagination, etc. When seen in this way, what we call "mind" is nothing over and above the faculties of brain. That doesn't mean, however, that we can dispense with "mentalistic" explanations. We will never speak, for example, of somebody changing his brain; rather, we say,
"He changed his mind." In psychiatry, in my view, we will always need mentalistic explanations of human behavior, even if--ontologically speaking--there is nothing "out there" in the world but brain! [3]
3. Pies R. Mind-language in the age of the brain: is "mental illness" a useful term? J Psychiatr Pract. 2015 Jan;21(1):79-83. doi: 10.1097/01.pra.0000460625.25676.59. PMID: 25603455.
Thanks Ron! Certainly, almost every position in the mind-body debate has a long conceptual history, it is nonetheless interesting to see how the details evolve. What is "it" that is being viewed in dual perspectives as physiological and psychological, for instance. For both Solms and de Haan, this something is "physical" (understood in a broad sense) but they focus on different sorts of things. Solms on information processing and de Haan on part-whole relations. For de Haan, the mind is not simply an epistemological device; for her, it is not the case that there is nothing out there but the brain. She endorses ontological emergence: global processes of sense-making have real ontological features that physiological processes do not.
17 months late, but what a read. I regret not formulating my thoughts on The Hidden Spring when I read it, but now want to go back and do so. And de Hann references a book on that was on my good reads for while that now is getting moved to the top!
This is a very interesting discussion, Awais--thank you! As you know, there is not much new in what is asserted by the authors you cite. Most of what they are arguing goes back to the British emergentist philosophers, such as J.S. Mill; and to the later (related) concept of supervenience, championed by Donald Davidson and others. These remain controversial theories, of course. [1]
From my perspective of "ontological monism and explanatory pluralism," nobody had a better take on the mind-body conundrum than Baruch Spinoza. He envisioned a single substance [hence, ontological monism] whose properties (attributes) could be viewed in either physical or mental terms--not two separate substances of "mind" and "brain," or "mind" and "body" (contra Descartes). That is, "...for Spinoza there is only one substance: God [or Nature]. Nonetheless, mind and body are different attributes of this one substance." [2]
Even better, in my view, is Aristotle's view of "mind" (psyche) as a set of faculties or abilities; e.g., perception, calculation, imagination, etc. When seen in this way, what we call "mind" is nothing over and above the faculties of brain. That doesn't mean, however, that we can dispense with "mentalistic" explanations. We will never speak, for example, of somebody changing his brain; rather, we say,
"He changed his mind." In psychiatry, in my view, we will always need mentalistic explanations of human behavior, even if--ontologically speaking--there is nothing "out there" in the world but brain! [3]
Best regards,
Ron
1. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/knowledge/emergence.html
2. https://askaphilosopher.org/2019/04/17/spinozas-mind-body-paralellism/
3. Pies R. Mind-language in the age of the brain: is "mental illness" a useful term? J Psychiatr Pract. 2015 Jan;21(1):79-83. doi: 10.1097/01.pra.0000460625.25676.59. PMID: 25603455.
Thanks Ron! Certainly, almost every position in the mind-body debate has a long conceptual history, it is nonetheless interesting to see how the details evolve. What is "it" that is being viewed in dual perspectives as physiological and psychological, for instance. For both Solms and de Haan, this something is "physical" (understood in a broad sense) but they focus on different sorts of things. Solms on information processing and de Haan on part-whole relations. For de Haan, the mind is not simply an epistemological device; for her, it is not the case that there is nothing out there but the brain. She endorses ontological emergence: global processes of sense-making have real ontological features that physiological processes do not.
17 months late, but what a read. I regret not formulating my thoughts on The Hidden Spring when I read it, but now want to go back and do so. And de Hann references a book on that was on my good reads for while that now is getting moved to the top!