Orestis Zavlis is a PhD student at the Psychoanalysis Unit in University College London. His work focuses on how to integrate psychoanalysis with computational science, as well as how to better define personality disorders. His substack, “Personality Disordered,” aims to address the latter by critically examining assumptions surrounding the concept of personality disorder.
TL;DR: In this post, I start from first principles to define (1) “personality” as a broad entity that contains all stable psychological aspects of people; (2) “character” as the moral evaluation of the stable psychological aspects of people (especially, the relational aspects); and “relational functioning” as the way people mentally re-present and relate to themselves and others. I then illustrate how these definitions lead to the conclusion that most mental disorders are “personality disorders” and that what we call today “personality disorders” were once “character disorders” but today can be appreciated as “relational disorders.”
In this commentary, I aim to clarify how I define the following: “personality” (disorder), “character” (disorder), “relating” (disorder). This commentary is in large part a (reactive) reply to Awais’ recent post, What is Disordered in Personality Disorder?. However, this commentary is also a (proactive) essay I’ve been meaning to publish anyways to clarify my own way of defining “personality-related phenotypes.”
Before I provide my definitions on these phenotypes, I would first like to clarify how I think. Unlike most psychologists who theorise from specific theoretical frameworks (and thus end up constraining their conclusions to those frameworks), I go against this approach by thinking from first principles. In brief, first principles thinking is about choosing the most minimal (and usually trans-theoretical) assumptions and then reasoning only from those assumptions to derive their logical conclusions. This approach is often difficult to implement in practice because the first principles need to be chosen carefully and wisely. But when successful, I believe, this approach has the advantage of transcending rarefied theories by providing, to use Aristotelian language, “universal” perspectives on things.
In what follows, I use this approach to try and provide, arguably for the first time, a clear, logical, and universal definition of “personality” (“disorder”), “character” (“disorder”), and “relational” (“disorder”). This is a strict standard I have placed on myself but hopefully I will convince the reader that my definitions are universally correct. With that said, let’s begin!
Personality
From a first principles perspective, personality has three defining properties: it is (1) psychological, (2) stable, and (3) broad. To begin with the first and easiest property, I highlight that “personality” is almost by definition about “the psychological aspects of the person.” Indeed, etymologically speaking, the word “personality” stems from the word “person,” which was historically used to characterize the various dimensions of “the human person,” such as the theological, legal, and eventually psychological dimension (with the latter being described using the word “personality” that first appeared in the French language; then late Middle English language; and was finally popularised in late 19th – early 20th centuries for reasons I explain subsequently). Thus, the first thing to note is that “personality” is about the psychological aspects of human beings.
The second thing to note is that “personality” is specifically about the relatively stable psychological aspects of human beings.1 This idea is predicated on the commonsense definition of “personality” as “who someone is, fundamentally.” Based entirely on this minimal assumption, for some psychological aspect to be part of personality, it must be “stable enough” to “characterize” or “typify” or “define” who someone is fundamentally speaking (i.e., not just in the moment, but over time). Indeed, to the extent that something is not “stable enough to typify who someone is” (e.g., consider a fleeting, situation-bound pattern), then it cannot logically be considered as part of who one is fundamentally (i.e., part of their “personality”). In this way, “personality” is about the stable psychological aspects that typify human beings.
Finally, “personality” is not any one of these aspects specifically. Instead, “personality” is all of these stable psychological aspects, broadly. This definition makes sense in this logical way: suppose I pick out one specific and stable psychological aspect of the person (say their typical way of thinking or feeling); in that case, I am not talking about a person’s “personality” per se but rather about some specific aspect of their personality (i.e., their typical way of thinking or their way of feeling). In this way, “personality” is fundamentally a broad entity: it concerns all of the stable psychological aspects of the person.
This last point is worth unpacking. Personality is a broad entity that comprises all stable psychological aspects of the person; but what kind of “entity” is this? I believe there are two ways this entity can be defined — and both of these require further assumptions, unfortunately.
The first way is theoretical: personality is a process that organizes all stable psychological aspects of the person. I acknowledge that this definition is strange. I also acknowledge that it is not well-defined: what is this process exactly — some magical string that makes all stable psychological aspects of the person function harmoniously? I am not sure what “personality organization” is, partly because various theorists (from Allport to Kernberg) define it differently; partly because this definition makes strong ontological assumptions that I am uncomfortable with; and partly because it’s unbelievably unclear (to me at least). But anyways I note that for the purposes of this essay, it does not matter what “personality organization” is; as we will see subsequently, no matter how this concept is defined, it leads to the conclusion that most mental disorders are disorders of “personality organization.”
Moving on to the second way of defining “personality,” I highlight that this one is more “descriptive” and preferable by yours truly. This descriptive way of defining “personality” is this: personality is simply the “sum-total” of its parts. Note that unlike the previous theoretical definition (which makes strong ontological assumptions), this alternative descriptive definition makes no such ontological assumptions. Instead, this descriptive definition simply implies that “personality” is a convenient linguistic placeholder to denote the sum of all stable psychological aspects that define a person. As we will see in the next section, this definition also leads to the unavoidable conclusion that most mental disorders are “personality disorders.”
Personality Disorder
Given that “personality” can be defined in at least three ways, “personality disorder” can, too, be defined in at least three ways.2 The first way follows directly from the first principles definition of “personality” and it is this: If personality refers to all stable psychological aspects of the person, then it logically follows that a personality disorder refers to a disorder in all stable psychological aspects of the person. Thus, contrasting what Awais has said (“personality disorder is not a disorder of the entirety of one’s personality or every aspect of one’s personality”), from first principles at least, personality disorder implies that all stable psychological aspects of the person are disordered.
Before anyone objects to this definition, I highlight once more that this is based on the aforementioned first-principles definition of personality, according to which “personality is psychological, stable, and broad” and ergo “personality disorder is psychological, stable, and broad, also.” Importantly, while I am aware that this is not how most theorists signify personality disorder in their theoretical minds, I have this inkling that this is how lots of patients implicitly do. To briefly illustrate with an example, I remember with amusement when a very intelligent and witty patient with “personality disorder” once told me (jokingly, not seriously):
Orestis, I understand the academic definition of “personality”; but when I think about my own personality, I feel like A LOT of my personality is my taste in music; does that then mean that because I have a “personality disorder,” my taste in music is also disordered?!
Again, before any boring academics become offended: This is a joke! But as Freud taught us, of course, all jokes reveal some hidden truth — and the truth here, I believe, is that patients think in the first principles way I outlined previously. And once again: from first principles (i.e., when we strip away all elaborate theoretical dressings), the concept of “personality” is simply “ALL the stable psychological aspects that define the person.” Ergo, from first principles, the “disorder of personality” is a “disorder in ALL of the stable psychological aspects that define the person.” Any additional clarification of this definition would require more assumptions; and patients don’t really care about our ad-hoc assumptions.
But since this essay is about clarifying things, for the sake of completeness, I shall consider these ad-hoc assumptions, so here we go! The first ad-hoc assumption is the theoretical one mentioned before: personality is a process that organizes all stable psychological aspects of the person. Based on this definition, we can draw the following conclusion: personality (organization) disorder is the disorder in the process that organizes all stable psychological aspects of the person.
I have explained the inner workings of this argument in another essay, so I will only briefly reiterate the main argument herein: Given the above definitions of “personality organization” and “personality organization disorder” AND given some robust pieces of empirical evidence (e.g., most mental disorders have early onset and most mental disorders last long enough to become entangled with one’s personality), I conclude that most mental disorders involve issues with how a person is psychologically organized in a relatively stable way (NOTE: I say “most” here because we have to exclude the “episodic disorders” which are not stable enough to become entangled with one’s personality and thus do not affect how the person is psychologically organized in a relatively stable way). Thus, I can say that (most) mental disorders are “personality organization disorders” in the sense that they affect in a relatively stable manner how the person is psychologically organized — a conclusion that is consistent with Kernberg’s theorizing according to which “personality” can be organized in at least three maladaptive ways: the neurotic, borderline, and psychotic ways, which, as both me and other theorists have emphasized, covers pretty much the entire universe of psychopathology.
Finally, the last definition of “personality disorder” is based on the descriptive definition of “personality” as the simple collection of the stable psychological aspects of the person. Under this descriptive definition, we can readily reach the conclusion that personality (collection) disorder is a collection of disorders in specific personality aspects. To illustrate with an analogy, consider the term “movement disorder” (which Awais has also brought up). On its own, this term does not refer to a specific kind of disorder; instead, this term is simply a descriptive umbrella term for various “movement-related disorders” such as Parkinson’s disease (typified by slowness of movement), essential tremor (typified by involuntary rhythmic shaking), and dystonia (typified by involuntary twisting). In the same exact way, the descriptive “personality collection disorder” (a weird term but one that I believe clarifies my argument well), is a class of specific “personality aspect disorders” (or “personality trait disorders”), such as emotional disorders (typified by stable disturbances in the ways a person feels), behavioral disorders (typified by stable disturbances in the ways a person behaves), cognitive-perceptual disorders (typified by stable disturbances in the ways a person thinks and perceives the world), and finally even the relational disorders (typified by stable disturbances in the ways a person relates to themselves as well as others).
Interestingly, we appear to have reached (in a completely different way) the same outcome of the previous definition of “personality”: that is, that most “mental disorders” can be viewed as “personality disorders” insofar as they involve stable dysfunctions in a person’s psychology. I have discussed at length elsewhere how this conclusion is unavoidable since the very idea of “personality” is too broad and non-specific to define a specific psychopathology. For this post, however, what I would like to highlight is this: there is no ontological distinction between personality and psychopathology since the moment any mental health problem (say, anxiety, depression, substance use, or anything else) becomes “stable enough” to characterize a human being, it automatically becomes an aspect of that person’s personality — and to the extent it is problematic, it also becomes a “problem of personality.”
Of course, we could all play with words and say: It’s not a “personality problem” per se because we can just simply call it a “stable psychological problem”; or even a “trait-like problem” or any other term that conveys basically the same point — and I agree that all of these linguistic notations would be equally right. But the essay today is about personality hence my adoption of personality language. This does not mean that I endorse this language or even that I prefer it clinically or theoretically; it’s simply to say: personality is this; ergo, personality disorder is that. And there is no way around that.
Character
The astute reader may by now have noticed that all of the aforementioned definitions of “personality disorder” bear very little resemblance to the common definitions of “personality disorders” (such as borderline, narcissism, and the like) — but why? Are these personality disorders not fundamentally about “personality” in any of the ways I defined previously?
Paradoxically, the answer is an astounding “yes”: the disorders that we now call “disorders of personality” were never historically about “personality” but rather about “character” (or, more precisely, about our “fantasies” regarding patients’ characters).3 Before I outline this argument further, however, let me first clarify what “character” is — and, importantly, how “character” differs from “personality” (since the two have been conflated historically).
To begin with, consider the following first principle: people have stable psychological aspects. I believe most people would accept this as self-evidently correct, so let’s move on to another principle: these stable psychological aspects differ in the extent to which they are “morally valuable” (to oneself or to others). Because not all people may accept this second principle, let’s qualify it briefly with an example: I, Orestis Zavlis, personally believe that being kind to other people is morally good. You may agree with this or you may disagree with this; but either way, you will converge with me in showing how we both morally evaluate (i.e., ascribe value to) this aspect of personality (whether a positive value, negative value, or neutral value).
Historically speaking, this “moral evaluation of personality” has been denoted with the term “character.” Before I outline some important and neglected historical facts about “character,” I want to first clarify three typically conflated ideas around character. First, we can morally evaluate ourselves, in which case we are inherently deciding whether a stable psychological aspect belongs to our “character.” To illustrate, consider this positive character inference “I enjoy being kind to others since that’s an expression of my character” vs. this negative character inference “I dislike being rude to others since I believe that’s inconsistent with my character.” These inferences imply that when we morally evaluate ourselves, we are judging whether an aspect is consistent with or belongs to our character (aka, moral system).
Second, we can morally evaluate others, in which case we can only express the extent to which we morally agree vs. disagree with how we imagine their character to be — but without knowing how their character actually is. To illustrate, consider this negative moral inference “I morally disagree with that person’s way of being” vs. this positive moral inference “I morally agree with that person’s way of being”. Without special knowledge of the other’s “true character” (which, as I explain below, is only revealed in their moral evaluation of themselves), the above statements are “empty” inferences, since all they do is simply express our (moral) agreement vs. disagreement with the other’s way of being—but without establishing whether that way of being truly belongs to the other’s character.
Finally, the only way we can establish whether our moral inference truly speaks about another’s character is if we have special access to their moral inference of themselves. For instance, consider this negative moral inference “I morally disagree when you’re rude to me.” This negative moral inference may be about the other’s true character (since they endorse this trait as an aspect their morality: “I enjoy being rude to you”) or may not be about the other’s true character (since they do not endorse this trait as an aspect of their morality: “I am sorry I was rude to you; I did not mean to; this is uncharacteristic of me; please forgive me”). The same of course applies for positive moral inferences (“I morally agree with you being nice to me”) that may be about one’s true character (“I enjoy being nice to you”) or may not be about one’s true character (“I dislike being nice to you but for politeness alone, I have to”). Thus, we can see how our moral inferences of others are orthogonal to others’ true character since their true character is only revealed in their own evaluations of themselves.
For the longest time (literally until the early 20th century), theorists discussed this idea of “character” not the previous idea of “personality.” I don’t want to prolong the essay more (and potentially bore the reader) by outlining all this history — but briefly consider the work of moral philosophers (like Plato, Aristotle, Hume, and Kant) who theorized about virtues and vices (i.e., good vs. bad character traits, like courage vs. cowardice, honesty vs. dishonesty, generosity vs. selfishness etcetera), psychoanalysts (like Anna Freud and Wilhelm Reich, who were the first to note that one’s ways of being are part of their character to the extent that they are consistent with their sense of self), and even early personality psychologists (like Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, who examined character traits like honesty, helpfulness, and self-control).
Although a complete outline of these perspectives and their nuances is beyond the purpose of this essay (not least because it goes against my early point on first principles thinking only), the main historical point worth noting is that “personality,” as a technical term, was popularized only around the turn of the twentieth century, a time during which psychologists despised the idea of “character” (because of its moral-ethical connotations) and sought to remove it from the field of “personality psychology,” which was curiously first known in 1932 as Character and Personality and only a decade later was repainted as Personality Psychology! As I explain in more detail in my most recent essay, the way psychologists sought to remove this term is by highlighting, quite astutely actually, that the term “character” does not add anything psychologically substantive beyond the term “personality” since all it does is simply “morally evaluate” existing aspects of personality. And because these aspects of personality can just be described psychologically (rather than also be evaluated morally), psychologists (notably, Gordon W. Allport) increasingly converged in suggesting that for “personality psychology” to be “scientific” it needs to be more “descriptive” (and thus “objective”) rather than “evaluative” (and thus “subjective”) — a view that ultimately led to the displacement of “character” with “personality” in academic psychology.
However, while psychologists were successful in displacing the term “character” with that of “personality” (all while patting themselves on the back that they became more “scientific”), the unfortunate truth of the matter is that “morally evaluative” or “character” language still persisted throughout “personality psychology” — only now it was less obvious because psychologists had no knowledge that character is simply “personality evaluated”! I won’t belabor this point but just to illustrate, consider the idea of “dark traits” (which is simply a moral evaluation of what can be descriptively outlined as “antagonistic traits”); or better yet the idea of “personality immaturity” (which is a moral evaluation of particular “personality disorder” symptoms). If Allport was alive today, he would not be happy with these terms since their language is neither “descriptive” nor “scientific” (!); instead, their language imposes a moral evaluation on an otherwise descriptive psychological aspect of the person — an ascription of value that few psychologists can even recognize today (see here for more details).
Character Disorder
Given the aforementioned points on “character,” what is a “character disorder”? Without getting into too many philosophical details, I note that for a phenotype to qualify as a “character disorder,” two conditions must be met: (1) that phenotype needs to concern one’s actual character (which as we have seen it’s NOT our moral evaluation of the person but rather their own evaluation of themselves — which determines which stable psychological aspects of themselves belong to their character); and (2) that phenotype needs to be “objectively disordered” (which, I apologize, but cannot define herein).4 To the extent that these conditions are not met, then we are not talking about a “character disorder” since (1) a phenotype may not be objectively disordered (e.g., consider homosexuality which was once a character disorder); or (2) a phenotype may not be viewed as part of oneself and may thus not be about one’s character (e.g., a person may technically behave in maladaptive ways but once asked, they deeply regret it and note that this is “uncharacteristic” of them; ergo, not part of their character).
In any case, having now clarified “character disorder,” let me turn to three historical details about said “disorder.” First, for most of human history, theorists defined character problems in a largely “subjective” not “objective” way: that is, they viewed certain phenotypes as “character problems” only insofar as they were “annoyed” by them (but without actually exploring whether the aspects that annoyed them were actually impaired or were parts of people’s character). The best example here is homosexuality: while homosexuality was classified as a “sociopathic personality disturbance” (because recall: “personality” language was increasingly adopted in the 20th century because it was more descriptive, objective, and of course scientific!), it was denoted a disorder “primarily in terms of society and of conformity with the prevailing cultural milieu” (DSM-I, pp. 38–39). Moreover, homosexuality only stopped being formally considered a “disorder” in 1987 (DSM-III-R) when a wealth of research indicated that gay people functioned well and did not consider themselves to be disordered. In this way, we can see how the initial reasoning for “homosexuality” as a “disorder” rested entirely on subjective moral inferences about “conformity” — and how over time, as research gave access to how gay people actually viewed themselves, it showed that this is not a disorder of “character.”
Second, beyond homosexuality, it is worth noting that all sorts of “personality-related phenotypes” were throughout the centuries evaluated morally. Example evaluations include moral evaluations of: arrogant people (narcissism), unstable or impulsive people (borderline), sexually expressive people (hysteria), socially withdrawn people (schizoid), superstitious people (schizotypal), and overly suspicious people (paranoid). Therefore, we can see that all aspects of personality can be evaluated morally — as well as that when this happens, what we call today “personality disorders” can be appreciated for how they were originally framed: “subjective character disorders” (that is, disorders but only in the eyes of the beholder).5
Finally, a close reading of history also shows us that moral evaluations were predominantly applied to the “relational” aspects of personality. To illustrate this, try to imagine the most horrible person you know: the person who you truly dislike most in the world. Doesn’t that picture involve a person who treats others badly (according to your liking, at least)? Someone who is perhaps arrogant, rude, selfish; someone who lies, cheats, manipulates; or, in short, someone who is behaving badly towards others or to you specifically? This picture brings me to this final conclusion: even though we could technically morally evaluate all kinds of personality aspects (e.g., we could morally evaluate “laziness” which is a behavioral trait; or “dogmatism,” which is a cognitive trait; or “mood instability,” which is an emotional trait), for some reason, we all have the rather basic human tendency to primarily evaluate the “relational aspects” of personality: that is, how we treat others, as well as also how we treat ourselves (since self-harming and suicidality also receive a lot of moral evaluations, unfortunately).
Relational Functioning
Based on all of the above, I believe we can now appreciate why “relational functioning” (i.e., how we treat others and ourselves) is typically conflated with “character” and “personality.” Briefly, it’s because “character” concerns the “moral evaluation of personality” which, as we have just seen, it’s usually applied on the “relational” aspects of personality (i.e., how we treat ourselves and others). Moreover, because “personality” came as a replacement for “character,” while not identical with character (since it’s simply a depository of stable personality aspects), it is frequently conflated with “character.” Thus, since character is primarily about “how we treat others and ourselves” and since “personality” is frequently conflated with “character” itself, relational functioning is frequently conflated with both character and personality.
The most recent example of this mega-conflation is of course the illogical construct of “personality functioning.” As Awais has also noted, this construct can be more specifically defined as “relational functioning” since it entails (1) “self-functioning” (how we treat the self) and (2) “interpersonal functioning” (how we treat others). Still, while this construct can be viewed in this clear way, I’d like to note that, operationally speaking, this construct has a long way to go before it can truly measure “relational functioning.”
Without expanding the discussion infinitely (see here and here for details) I note that the way I define relational functioning (without first principles this time) is: (1) how we mentally re-present ourselves and others and (2) how we relate (i.e., “treat”) ourselves and others. The current construct of “self-interpersonal functioning”, however, goes against this logic since it contains a bunch of unrelated aspects like “identity” (which appears to operationalize emotional pathology), “self-direction” (which appears to operationalize impulse-related pathology), and “empathy” (which appears to operationalize nothing substantive really). In this way, the current construct of “personality functioning”, while interpretable as “relational functioning”, is not genuinely “relational functioning” — and it’s also certainly not “personality functioning” because it does not speak about any of the earlier definitions of personality (i.e., personality as a general process of organization or personality as a collection of different stable psychological aspects of the person). In short, therefore, the construct of “personality functioning” is theoretically empty.
Relational Disorders
This is the briefest section because all I want to note before closing is this:
(1) The relational disorders are simply the disorders of “relational functioning” — and for more details on how I define them, please see here and here.
(2) The relational disorders have been historically viewed as “subjective character disorders”: that is, as “disorders” but only in the eyes of particular beholders, who judge their psychological aspects morally (but without establishing, at least in the eyes of critical theorists, whether those aspects are genuinely disordered or belong to one’s character).
(3) These “subjective character disorders” were later denoted as “personality disorders” (when the term “personality” gradually replaced the term “character” in the 20th century).
(4) Ergo, the disorders that we call today “personality disorders” were once falsely viewed as “character disorders” but can today be appreciated as “relational disorders.”
My Answer to Awais
If you’ve made this far, you may be disappointed to hear that there aren’t any fundamental disagreements between myself and Awais (from my end at least). The only thing I’d like to note is that when reading and re-reading Awais’ post, I had the feeling, at times, that Awais placed “self-interpersonal functioning” at the center of “personality.” For instance, Awais wrote that: “There feels something special about the place of self-interpersonal functioning in personality.” However, if you have followed my essay closely, you will have noticed how “self-interpersonal functioning” does not have a central place in “personality” (as personality is simply a repository of all stable aspects of psychology) but may have a central place in “character” (since most “character judgements” concern how we treat others as well as ourselves).
Indeed, as we have seen, the term “character” predates that of “personality” and was used for most of human history to judge people morally. Importantly, these character judgements were applied mostly on the relational aspects of personality, thus conflating the “relational disorders” (maladaptive ways of relating to oneself and/or others) with the “subjective character disorders.” Finally, while this moral framing was in place for virtually most of human history, the (damned!) personality psychologists replaced “character” with “personality,” making us all feel like there is something special about “relational functioning” in “personality” — where, in reality, the only thing special about “relational functioning” is just how easy it is to morally evaluate.
Although I like to tease contemporary psychology for how ridiculous it often is, I want to emphasize that the transition from “character” to “personality” is not itself a negative event. The main negative event, instead, is how ignorant we are of this history and how we are letting it all repeat before our eyes. To be clear, I also blame myself here: I am also guilty of sometimes treating “relational functioning” as having a central place in “personality.” But the more history I study, the more convinced I am that for “personality” to be actually scientific, it needs to divorce itself completely from “character” and simply be what it was originally meant to be: namely, a descriptive repository of all stable psychological aspects (without any kind of central or moral psychological aspect). So, let’s all learn from history and fulfill this original promise of personality by not “pathologizing” it (especially not pathologizing it morally).
As for the diagnostic systems, I want to highlight that I fully agree with Awais’ alternative system and that in an ideal universe, I would ONLY include “personality” and “character” in a diagnostic system as: WARNING: MAKE SURE YOU ASK THE PATIENT: “IS THIS PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT PART OF YOUR CHARACTER?” BEFORE EVEN THINKING ABOUT A POSSIBLE “PERSONALITY” OR “CHARACTER” DIAGNOSIS. Other than this warning, I would have no other mention of “personality” or “character” in a diagnostic system because I am now old enough to appreciate just how easy it is for humans to abuse such a system.
The “Relational Sensivity” Proposal for ICD
But wait a minute: If I don’t want a system with “character” or “personality” diagnoses, then why did I NOT choose this format for the ICD-12? Why did I NOT, in other words, create a proposal that deletes the “personality” (aka, “character”) diagnoses entirely in ICD-12?
The simple answer is: politics. From my (extremely) limited experience in diagnostic workgroup meetings, I realized just how unbelievably slowly and incrementally diagnostic systems change. I also realized that it’s almost impossible to even recommend the entire deletion (or renaming) of a specific class of mental disorders: Just look at what happened last time when the DSM-5 committee tried to simply replace all categorical personality disorders with one “dimensional personality disorder”: there was such an intense internal disagreement that, in the end, this system was not implemented and it’s currently sitting, quite embarrassingly if you ask me, in a supplementary section called “Section III: Emerging Measures and Models” showing us exactly what happens when people recommend radical changes: they simply don’t get implemented!
Because of these political reasons (and because I am also not a very powerful person: recall please that I am still a PhD student who keeps getting ridiculed by senior academics for all the strange ideas I outlined previously!), I opted for the more politically and pragmatically sensible solution of only redefining BPD — as well as clarifying the diagnosis of “PD” so that I can at least reduce some iatrogenic harms done by it… I cannot change the world unfortunately but I can at least make this little change — and, indeed, I believe that this little change is a major win in its own right, given that I, somehow, was able to get it co-signed by two “immortal diagnostic enemies” (namely, Peter Tyrer and Peter Fonagy).
Again, diagnostic systems change slowly and painfully — and to the extent that someone like me wishes to change them, they have to respect this process (even if they disagree with said process). Changing “borderline personality disorder” to a “relational sensitivity disorder” is a small but meaningful first step in this painful process. The rest will hopefully come with time.
Previously in this series
I appreciate that a complete definition of “personality stability” would require me to spell out the precise timeframe at which some aspect of one’s psychology becomes part of their personality. While there is no agreed-upon standard for this idea, some theorists have noted that a lower bound of “personality stability” is likely on the order of “multiple weeks at least” since anything less than this is arguably too transient and uncharacteristic of one to be considered as part of someone’s personality (DeYoung, 2015, p.39).
I say that “personality and personality disorder can be defined in at least three ways” because of course there could be more definitions of both “personality” and “personality disorder”. But such definitions would require more assumptions, making them specific to particular idiosyncratic theories rather than universally true which is my aim in this essay.
There are some exceptions here like Ribot’s “maladaptive personalities” and Kraepelin’s “psychopathic personalities” –– but even these are predicated on earlier descriptions of “character-related problems”. I shall leave the full history of how “character disorders” became “personality disorders” for another essay.
I cannot define “objectively disordered” here since that’s an essay in its own right and I am not even sure I can define it fully objectively either, so I apologise in advance for failing the interested reader.
The only historical counter-example here could be severely antisocial people, for whom there is sometimes clear evidence of a severe “character disorder”. But even then, it must be noted that for “character disorder” to truly apply for them, the two criteria I outlined earlier must be clearly documented (i.e., objective pathology and antisocial traits truly belonging to one’s character/morality).






