I wrote my doctoral dissertation on free will. I published mostly on free will and moral responsibility in the more abstract sense before going into psych stuff. I still teach free will. But I don't understand what this part means:
"Free will is a problematic notion for me for the purposes of adjudication and prevention of problem behaviors. I alluded to these in my prior essay for your ‘five ideas’ program. In short, I think that existing philosophical theories about free will are deficient in that I reject a common theme through all of them, namely, the concept of determinism, whether ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. The problem is that determinism marginalizes, or overlooks completely, the ever-present effects of entropy or randomness, which undermine deterministic accounts."
Maybe there's some mix-up here between how philosophers use the term "determinism" and how it may be used outside of our field?
Carl Hoefer defines determinism as follows at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Determinism: Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."
We don't know if the world is deterministic in this sense. Arguably, quantum mechanics suggests that it's not. But it MIGHT be deterministic in this sense and yet, quite often, impossible to predict for mere mortals. The weather may be too chaotic to ever predict, human behaviour may be too complicated to ever predict, the behaviour of elementary particles may be impossible to predict even if they ultimately obey some deep deterministic laws that we don't know about, etc. All of this could be true even if the universe is ultimately deterministic.
Philosophers discuss what, if anything, follows if the world is deterministic, but few people would say with any confidence that it IS (you have an easier time finding free will philosophers who say with any confidence that it's probably NOT).
But, John and Awais, if you wanna read up on free will, moral responsibility and retributivism, COME TO ME! I have the papers!
I've argued that debates about free will and moral responsibility will likely go on forever in philosophy, because you've got several camps whose theories are compatible with our best science but differ in which intuitions they rely on. Most likely, people's intuitions are just different, and will never homogenize, so we'll always have these different camps.
But that in itself is a reason not to have a retributivist criminal justice system. It's as illiberal to base a societal institution on controversial philosophical theories, built on intuitions that not everyone shares, as it would be to base it on some religion that not everyone shares. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-020-09436-6
Here, I defend my own brand of compatibilism: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-019-01292-2 I believe I'm right and philosophers who disagree with me are wrong. But I would never stake someone's life or liberty on that claim!
Here, I argue that it's often better to focus on external obstacles that people face than either brain dysfunctions or philosophical free will scepticism if you want to excuse them: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phis.12243
This isn't all, of course! I've got tons! You wanna learn more about free will and moral responsibility and how to fit them within a scientific worldview, I've got your backs!
Thanks Sofia! Speaking for myself, I’m of the view that human agency is a real thing and it entails a certain degree of moral responsibility, regardless of the truth of determinism. However, I also don’t think that this supports that idea of retributivist criminal justice system or that a CMC understanding of crime should be built around the idea of free will. I suspect John could in principle make his case without taking any definitive position on the free will philosophical debate. (I’ll alert him to your comment to so that he can respond if he prefers)
I should add, too, that Michael Moore has built a career out of defending retributivism, and he's got a very simple, naturalistic view of human behaviour. So it's really not the case that retributivism is only defended by people who believe in some fancy, religiously coloured version of free will. I reviewed his latest book on the topic a couple of years ago. https://philpapers.org/archive/JEPMSM.pdf
Sofia, thanks for your very thoughtful and detailed comment. Awais has it right when he notes that my general account and conclusions in VAPD2 don't depend on a particular account of free will (or complex causality), so my offhand, unelaborated, and incomplete discussion of free will in the interview should be taken with a 'grain of salt'. A paper on free will would be a nice thing to do in the future, and at that time I'll definitely reach out to you to compare notes and read more of your work.
The way I heard the maxim is: “T'is hell to write, but heaven to have written." Ironically, I heard this the very day I finished my doctoral dissertation from a perfect stranger while doing some photocopying in the university library.
Please consider a possible error:
"After my talk at the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry meeting *last year* in Vienna, Diogo came up to me and recited chapter and verse from VAPD2 about how I had problematized the issue of ‘vice-laden disorders’ in that book."
If this encounter happened last year, how could Diogo be quoting from VAPD2?
I’d guess Diogo had seen prepublication drafts (which were shared with some people) or perhaps they are referring not to the book itself but to the talk based on the book.
Ms/Dr Weber, you are a better proofreader than I am. Thanks for catching that error. Diogo was referring to Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis, e.g. VAPD1, not the new book, VAPD2. I 4 1 think thet skolers shud rite gud. More seriously, thanks for your attention and note.
Dear JZS: I have a PhD in history, but I was lucky enough to proofread for the American Psychological Association for 14 years. I refer to those years as the time I've got my informal MS in psychology. We all make mistakes. All of us! I caught this mistake through the courteous but rather confrontational tone between Diogo and you.
I wrote my doctoral dissertation on free will. I published mostly on free will and moral responsibility in the more abstract sense before going into psych stuff. I still teach free will. But I don't understand what this part means:
"Free will is a problematic notion for me for the purposes of adjudication and prevention of problem behaviors. I alluded to these in my prior essay for your ‘five ideas’ program. In short, I think that existing philosophical theories about free will are deficient in that I reject a common theme through all of them, namely, the concept of determinism, whether ‘strong’ or ‘weak’. The problem is that determinism marginalizes, or overlooks completely, the ever-present effects of entropy or randomness, which undermine deterministic accounts."
Maybe there's some mix-up here between how philosophers use the term "determinism" and how it may be used outside of our field?
Carl Hoefer defines determinism as follows at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
"Determinism: Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law."
We don't know if the world is deterministic in this sense. Arguably, quantum mechanics suggests that it's not. But it MIGHT be deterministic in this sense and yet, quite often, impossible to predict for mere mortals. The weather may be too chaotic to ever predict, human behaviour may be too complicated to ever predict, the behaviour of elementary particles may be impossible to predict even if they ultimately obey some deep deterministic laws that we don't know about, etc. All of this could be true even if the universe is ultimately deterministic.
Philosophers discuss what, if anything, follows if the world is deterministic, but few people would say with any confidence that it IS (you have an easier time finding free will philosophers who say with any confidence that it's probably NOT).
But, John and Awais, if you wanna read up on free will, moral responsibility and retributivism, COME TO ME! I have the papers!
I've argued that debates about free will and moral responsibility will likely go on forever in philosophy, because you've got several camps whose theories are compatible with our best science but differ in which intuitions they rely on. Most likely, people's intuitions are just different, and will never homogenize, so we'll always have these different camps.
But that in itself is a reason not to have a retributivist criminal justice system. It's as illiberal to base a societal institution on controversial philosophical theories, built on intuitions that not everyone shares, as it would be to base it on some religion that not everyone shares. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12152-020-09436-6
Here, I defend my own brand of compatibilism: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-019-01292-2 I believe I'm right and philosophers who disagree with me are wrong. But I would never stake someone's life or liberty on that claim!
And here's a madness/psych-oriented paper about moral responsibility, where I discuss how it's unfeasible AND undesirable to try to replace what you call "folk-psychology" here completely with causal explanations of behaviour. https://imsj.journals.publicknowledgeproject.org/index.php/imsj/article/view/5243
Here, I argue that it's often better to focus on external obstacles that people face than either brain dysfunctions or philosophical free will scepticism if you want to excuse them: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phis.12243
This isn't all, of course! I've got tons! You wanna learn more about free will and moral responsibility and how to fit them within a scientific worldview, I've got your backs!
Thanks Sofia! Speaking for myself, I’m of the view that human agency is a real thing and it entails a certain degree of moral responsibility, regardless of the truth of determinism. However, I also don’t think that this supports that idea of retributivist criminal justice system or that a CMC understanding of crime should be built around the idea of free will. I suspect John could in principle make his case without taking any definitive position on the free will philosophical debate. (I’ll alert him to your comment to so that he can respond if he prefers)
Thanks!
I should add, too, that Michael Moore has built a career out of defending retributivism, and he's got a very simple, naturalistic view of human behaviour. So it's really not the case that retributivism is only defended by people who believe in some fancy, religiously coloured version of free will. I reviewed his latest book on the topic a couple of years ago. https://philpapers.org/archive/JEPMSM.pdf
Sofia, thanks for your very thoughtful and detailed comment. Awais has it right when he notes that my general account and conclusions in VAPD2 don't depend on a particular account of free will (or complex causality), so my offhand, unelaborated, and incomplete discussion of free will in the interview should be taken with a 'grain of salt'. A paper on free will would be a nice thing to do in the future, and at that time I'll definitely reach out to you to compare notes and read more of your work.
The way I heard the maxim is: “T'is hell to write, but heaven to have written." Ironically, I heard this the very day I finished my doctoral dissertation from a perfect stranger while doing some photocopying in the university library.
Please consider a possible error:
"After my talk at the International Network for Philosophy and Psychiatry meeting *last year* in Vienna, Diogo came up to me and recited chapter and verse from VAPD2 about how I had problematized the issue of ‘vice-laden disorders’ in that book."
If this encounter happened last year, how could Diogo be quoting from VAPD2?
We historians are sensitive to chronology.
I’d guess Diogo had seen prepublication drafts (which were shared with some people) or perhaps they are referring not to the book itself but to the talk based on the book.
Awais, see my reply to Kathleen. Diogo was referring to VAPD1, and if it's not too late to correct this in the main text, please do!
Edited!
Ms/Dr Weber, you are a better proofreader than I am. Thanks for catching that error. Diogo was referring to Values and Psychiatric Diagnosis, e.g. VAPD1, not the new book, VAPD2. I 4 1 think thet skolers shud rite gud. More seriously, thanks for your attention and note.
Dear JZS: I have a PhD in history, but I was lucky enough to proofread for the American Psychological Association for 14 years. I refer to those years as the time I've got my informal MS in psychology. We all make mistakes. All of us! I caught this mistake through the courteous but rather confrontational tone between Diogo and you.